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 THE NEOPRAGMATIST’S HAMMER: 
FORGING ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY 
DAVID OLIVER KASDAN 
ABSTRACT 
Public administration is challenged to provide a coherent model of authority in 
modern democratic society.  Authority is necessary for governance, yet it runs against 
the liberal state.  Reconciling administrative authority with the American polity 
requires an approach that situates governance as the outcome of communal solidarity.  
This reconciliation includes deflating the metanarrative of authority that has been 
constructed on traditions of administrative representation, expertise, and practice.  
These traditions of authority must be redescribed in current contexts and shaped by 
the discourse between public administration and the polity as equal members of an 
epistemic community.  Neopragmatism, the postmodern upgrade to classical 
pragmatism’s “truth as justified belief”, is offered as the theoretical approach to 
reframe administrative authority by a process that works for consensus about public 
problems and governance in light of the objective of social progress. 
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CHAPTER I 
AUTHORITY, NEOPRAGMATISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF 
METANARRATIVES 
 
The problem of administrative authority is reconciling how a free society can 
agree to governance.  American public administration operates in a liberal 
democracy, pitting its authority against traditions of bootstrap individualism and a 
prevalent distrust of government.  The growth of government in response to public 
problems brings out issues between the polity and administrators as the frequency and 
depth of their interactions increases.  Coupled with the belief that Western progress 
implies better democracy, the growth of public administration and accompanying 
claims of authority to conduct governance have come to require a redescription of 
what that authority means for America and social progress in the 21st century.   
O.C. McSwite cautions that, “It is when institutions begin to fail, to lose 
legitimacy, that they become of concern.  This starts to occur when authority begins 
to contradict itself and the vacancy on which it is founded becomes exposed” (2003, 
p. 190).  How can public administration, derived from American political theory in 
the context of the liberal constitutional state, operate using standards that are at best 
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 democratically dynamic and at worst unfathomably nonexistent?  If our access to the 
Truth, as the postmodern perspective holds, is an elusive objective that necessarily 
fosters asymmetric epistemologies, then how does governance proceed under the 
principles of social justice and liberal democracy? 
Authority is a social, political, and ontological problem that necessarily breeds 
dichotomies at every turn, such as the schisms between facts and values or means and 
ends (Harmon, 2006).   Authority has maintained the status of a metanarrative, a 
grand tradition of axiomatic import; since the first human settlements, the warrant for 
action in the public interest has been allowed under assumed traditions and protocols.   
Authority has traditionally hinged on epistemological tenets that were established in 
adherence to the dominance of rational empiricism.  As the main stream of human 
inquiry has focused on understanding causal relationships, authority has been 
associated with one’s access to the understanding of such relationships.   For 
example, the physicist who can explain the workings of complex mechanisms holds a 
form of authority because the phenomenon can be conveyed from the observation into 
an operational theory of mechanics. 
Authority is a language problem; by acting “in the name of” an authority, one 
is engaged in discourse about the extension and limits of authority as a concept.   The 
problem of authority is at the level of political theory, yet it is also a philosophical 
issue, a pervasive historical concept, and a postmodern linguistic paradox that is 
manifest in public administration.  In the administrative context, authority comprises 
a set of challenges for justification, legitimacy, and warrants for activity. 
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 The problem from the administrative perspective lies in the span that Frank 
Goodnow (1900) described between the expression of public will and the execution 
of that will.   The span is often characterized by the politics-administration 
dichotomy; politics is positioned as a normative discipline while administration is 
characterized to the polity as a positivist practice.   The span is measured by 
constructs of representation that cannot be avoided or negotiated without appeals to 
further constructs of representation.  The units of measurement for the span include 
the construct of representation between the actual will of the people and the ability of 
politics to redescribe that will as policy, then followed by the construct between the 
political redescription into policy and the interpretation of that policy as governance 
for public administrators to enact.  These are the broadest conceptions of 
representation; the jumps from the polity to the politics to public administration may 
be atomized into smaller relationships of representation that allow the process to 
work.  Yet all these moments of representation incur a cost to authority that is 
realized in the layers of abstractions between what the people want and what the 
people get.  The probability that public administrators can maintain authority as a 
derivative of representation is quite low if the dichotomy is an accurate description of 
our governance process: “authority is grounded in the presumptive capacity, if not 
givenness, to articulate the will of a We, to formulate a sovereign will.  Post-
traditional conditions, however, present formidable obstacles to this We, not simply 
to articulating it but accepting it as such” (Catlaw, 2006, p. 264). 
The effort to get from the problem of authority to its reconciliation in 
democratic practice is fraught with the aforementioned abstractions that are, 
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 appropriately, often bureaucratic in nature.  Public administration conducts 
governance on behalf of the polity at the behest of the policy makers, negotiating the 
relationship under the mantle of representation.  If the political process is intended to 
capture the expression of the public will and the purpose of the legislative system is 
to reformulate that expression into policy, then we have a bureaucracy of linguistic 
issues to negotiate as well.  This has not been ignored by public administration 
scholars, but it has yet to be resolved (Miller & Fox, 2006; Harmon, 2006). 
The polity’s deference to administrators for governance is in a state of flux as 
we, “rankle at the onerous burden of authority in our daily lives even though political 
spin meisters assure us…that laws…have set us free” (Abel, 2007, p. 58).  The 
condition of a free society conferring powers of governance to public administration 
is especially troubling when the methods of justification are misaligned to the 
objectives of the political process, thus producing what Arendt observed to be a 
“crisis of authority” (2000, p. 462).  She attributes the crisis to be “political in origin 
and nature” – political  movements have upended the traditions of authority that were 
formed in the basic instances of human behavior, i.e. the relationship between adults 
and children built on obedience to established practice (p. 463).  Schaar (1984) also 
targets the weakening of traditional bases of authority, noting that, “it is becoming 
clear that the decline of legitimate authority is the product of the ideal and material 
forces that have been the defining attributes of modern authority itself” (p. 107).   
 Caught between the principles and the practices of democratic society, public 
administration suffers from the lack of coherency between the theory and the use of 
authority.  Prevailing metanarratives of democratic public administration and 
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 governing authority further confound how administrators can provide sufficient 
accountability for their actions.  By looking to political theory to situate the warrants 
of authority, public administration may find the support it requires to forge a concept 
of authority that is a product of consensus, reconcilable to the principles of our 
liberal-constitutional context, and operationalized into a practice that is more 
consistently accountable to the democratic polity in commensurable language. 
 This dissertation addresses such issues pertaining to administrative authority 
by advancing the philosophy of neopragmatism.  Neopragmatism offers a justification 
for authority beyond metanarratives; it provides accountability outside of fixed 
contexts by appealing to a politically dynamic idea of solidarity formed by the polity.  
It confronts the linguistic issues of authority in bureaucracy by embracing discourse 
as the administrative practice of forming consensus.  The application of “the 
neopragmatist’s hammer” tempers authority for postmodern governance without 
relying on tenuous correspondence theories of objective knowledge.  The rough edges 
of classical public administration that are the remnants of connections to positivist 
ideals are pounded out by this postmodern approach.  Whereas governance has shown 
dependence on normative principles posturing as objective ideals for its guidance in 
the liberal state, neopragmatism offers to restructure that relationship and stabilize 
administrative authority without the multitude of frayed guidelines it has used to 
maintain its perilous balance of tensions.  Instead of holding a nervous position as the 
arbiter of political neutrality – defending administrative action by the power of 
rational empiricism and the manipulation of methodologies to illuminate causal 
relationships – public administration can be predicated on a contextual notion of 
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 progress, solidarity, and non-exclusionary practices for mediating consensus that 
more aptly suit the democratic polity. 
The objectives of this dissertation research are to: 1) outline the traditional 
public administration metanarrative around authority in the democratic polity; 2) 
provide an understanding of neopragmatism as a philosophy with a meaningful 
application to governance; 3) redevelop the concept of authority in the neopragmatist 
perspective; and, 4) offer a model of neopragmatist public administration and its 
approach to authority in the liberal state.  These objectives correspond to the chapters 
following this introduction. 
 
1.1 Statement of Problem  
Public administration is challenged to establish its authority in the democratic state. 
What is the nature of administrative authority in the liberal, constitutional 
democracy of America?  How can public administrators maintain effective authority 
for governance today?  Are the traditional tenets of technical expertise, 
representation, and administrative practice sufficiently enduring for the progress of 
our state?  Does the influence of rational empiricism and institutional memory 
overshadow creative efforts at social progress?  How can the need for governance and 
its requisite exercise of authority over the public be reconciled with the origin of such 
authority being rooted in the democratic polity itself?  As Orion White asserts, “the 
authority problem is central to the field of Public Administration, or at least has held 
visibility as a central issue since the 1960s,” and “authority, rather than power, is 
endemic to the question of social organization” (in Wamsley, et al., 1990, pp. 182-3).   
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 Policy makers have no ground to claim that their policy contents are ideal or 
immutable as evidenced by the continual revisions of policy.  Consequently, they 
have no claim that their bureaucratic structures and implementation schemes are the 
one best way warranted from a metaphysical standard of governance.  These 
shortcomings, especially when aggravated by the unimagined contingencies that can 
never be accounted for in even the most detailed planning, lead to the recognition that 
public administration is not an exact science.  It cannot rely on rules and standards 
that are created by humans and yet also held to transcend the limits of human 
knowledge.  In other words, governance does not exist in the ether as some set of 
processes and bureaucracy that any form of human inquiry can approach as an 
objective for practice. 
Plain logic then dictates that the absence of foundational guidance from a 
perfect model of governance has a correlated absence of foundational authority to 
carry out governance.  This is the heart of the matter: the authority that public 
administration needs to implement policy and address what it is told are the public 
problems – the latitude to develop practices and strive for efficiency and effectiveness 
– cannot appeal to a higher power than the people themselves.  Administrative 
authority depends on justification; this relationship is rife with inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, and incommensurability. 
At the most basic philosophical level, authority requires the responsibility of 
accurate representation insofar as an appeal to authority is an appeal to a concept that 
stands behind the office or person in an authoritative position.  Authority is not a 
thing that can be held in the hand – the pen and sword may be instruments of 
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 authority, but they are not authority themselves – and therefore authority is a label or 
representation of something else.  Arendt (2000, p. 463-464) discusses authority from 
the hierarchy of Plato’s sense of political society, calling it the “dominant” concept of 
our history.  The hierarchy implies relationships between people while the political 
society suggests governance through representational structures.  Any instance of 
authority then works through the relationship between two or more parties wherein 
one is chartered to act with a responsibility that is an extension of powers via 
representation.  Representation is a concession by the polity to allow for a small 
governing body to serve its interests.  The responsibility of public administration is 
then concentrated in the idea of accurate representation, meaning that the polity’s 
concession for governance is carried out in accordance with how the polity envisions 
its interests to be served.   
The problem becomes obvious from an enlightened contemporary (as well as 
a postmodern) view of how the world operates: what is the standard for accurate 
representation in the democratic state?  How can public administration strive to act in 
accordance with the polity’s interests?  This transitive exercise from the Statement of 
Problem (above) puts authority, as the embodiment of accurate representation, 
squarely in the sights of those who contend that we, as individuals or public 
administrators, do not and cannot have access to reality and big “T” truths.  Not only 
is this elite access denied to the general public, but the facility for representation as a 
neutral practice is tarnished.  Here is where the criticism of authority by 
neopragmatism comes in most forcefully: the who, what, when, where, why and how 
of authority are all up for debate if the notions of an objective truth and representation 
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 are rejected.  As developed in the later chapters of this research, neopragmatism 
provides a reconciliatory perspective to the problem when set in the context of a 
liberal democratic community. 
This dissertation is interested in the dynamics of authority that occur between 
public administrators and the polity, probing the relationships and difficulties that 
exist between the agents of governance and the citizens who are served by that 
activity.  At the most basic level, theorists have contended that public administration 
needs some warrant for its actions that satisfies the question of its right to do such 
things in a democratic state (Abel, 2007; Catlaw, 2006; Friedrich, 1958, 1963; 
Sementelli, 2007; Simon, 1997).  Spanning the whole of the issue is a traditional 
understanding of administrative authority in democracy, a metanarrative that has been 
constructed on generalized notions of social behavior from the earliest moments of 
human settlements.  Undergirding this metanarrative are the traditions of public 
administration that have served as the elementary justification for the metanarrative in 
American society: the technical expertise attributed to administrative offices, the 
notion of public administration as democratic representation, and practice as the 
episteme of governance.  These metanarratives are set in the context of the liberal 
constitutional state as manifest in the policy that public administration upholds (Rohr, 
1998). The dissertation will unpack this metanarrative and the traditions to illuminate 
how they have contributed to the functional problems of administrative authority in 
the current state. 
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 1.2 Statement of Major Thesis  
Neopragmatism can be used to develop a conception of authority for public 
administration that is coherent in the modern democratic state. 
In the face of recent administrative failures, such as the recovery operations 
from Hurricane Katrina or the oversight mismanagement of contractors in Iraq, there 
is every right to question administrative authority.  If mishaps of governance are 
attributed to administration, then the underlying expertise that warrants public 
administrators’ discretion, the political representation granted for governance, and the 
catalog of past practices are culprits in the erosion of its authority.  To avoid 
challenges to its authority from both legislators and citizens, public administration 
may need to move away from its defining constraints.  Authority needs to be situated 
beyond inflexible principles based on Truths in a redevelopment that incorporates 
context and consensus.  We must reconsider the nature of administrative authority to 
be organic to the polity, not derived from principles held to be corresponding to 
constitutionally delineated ideals.  Such an approach is justified by a theory that 
balances both the constitutional with the democratic and the expert with the layman.  
Neopragmatism informs such a theory, as Miller (2004, p. 245) presents the 
philosophy: “Freed from foundationalism, new pragmatism raises new possibilities.  
Public administrators are not in service to the rulers or even to the laws made by the 
rulers; rather, they are in service to the problems that are placed on their doorstep.” 
The focus of public administration on solving public problems is fundamental 
to the approach and the proposed conception of authority.  The idea of public 
problems being “placed on their doorstep” may be considered more democratically as 
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 the problems that the polity and public administrators determine through discourse, 
much as Follett’s (1924, p. 4) pursuit of integrative processes suggested that, “we 
seek a  method by which the full integrity of the individual shall be one with social 
progress.” 
Reflecting on the work of his forerunner in American philosophy, Richard 
Rorty stated that, “As Dewey saw it, whole-hearted pursuit of the democratic ideal 
requires us to set aside any authority save that of a consensus of our fellow humans” 
(2006, p. 257).  Rorty shares a goal with Dewey in ridding society of its misbegotten 
attempts to establish a correspondence with authoritative realities and instead live in a 
democracy of free cooperation, although they differ in their mechanics.  This idea of 
consensus, also expressed as the shared goals of a community, is a fundamental 
connection for authority and the democratic state.  Yet it took decades to advance 
from the positivist attitude of early public administration and acknowledge that the 
governing of a state may not be as straightforward as the rational-empirical practices 
previously held as administrative ideals: “Between the time of Dewey and Rorty, 
something happened: the postmodern assault on foundations” (Miller, 2004, p. 243). 
From the vantage of a contemporary scholar of public administration and 
pragmatism, Hildebrand (2005) posits governance as involving, 
The application of general and fixed concepts (policies, laws, standards) to 
particular and fluid practicalities (situations, circumstances, persons), 
[requiring that] the agency will need to have strategies ready to deal with 
unusual or problematic cases…Postmodern parlance might call this rethinking 
hermeneutics or deconstruction.  Pragmatists simply call it inquiry. (p. 355). 
 
This picture invites inquiry into the nature and extent of administrative 
authority, as well as the activity carried out under such warrants.  Too much authority 
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 leads to authoritarianism, while too little leaves the state lame.  Establishing the 
optimal authority for public administration at any point in time and practice is thus a 
central challenge to maintaining efficient and effective governance for American 
society.  It has been a perennial topic in the public administration discourse: 
“Authority as a concept has occupied a central, almost hallowed place in studies of 
the administrative state, of philosophy, and of the public sector” (Sementelli, 2007, p.  
115).   
In the same way that Rorty (1979, 1982) debunked truth as correspondence to 
reality in his development of neopragmatism from classical pragmatism, this 
dissertation looks to disassociate authority from any accountability to objective 
principles, fixed standards, or metanarratives that are not plausibly supported in 
democratic discourse with the public.  The parallels between the components of the 
philosophical argument and this dissertation’s effort are readily correlated; however, 
the process is not.  The philosophical argument rejecting metaphysical appeals to a 
true reality is more easily accessed than the political rejection of administrative 
standards that have formed the popular collective conception of governance.  The 
polity is wont to adhere to ideals that justify the state and is comfortable with the 
constraints of the Constitution when those constraints are promoted to hold the value 
of objective truth.  Thus, the goal of this thesis is similar to Rorty’s goal in 
challenging foundationalism: to contest the traditions of authority as a power granted 
by parchment and political procedure heretofore regarded as having exclusive access 
to a set of ideal principles embodied in some notion of the public will (or the 
Constitution), and instead look to more contextually and linguistically coherent 
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 notions of authority that are formulated by public discourse and a nuanced notion of 
solidarity.  It is helpful to place the goal within the concept of the state, “not as a 
structure of government but rather as the manner in which individuals understand 
their actions to be related to each other and to those of their government in a political 
community” (Spicer, 1997, p. 91).  This begs the need for greater consciousness of an 
epistemic community and enhancing the relationship between the public and public 
administrators. 
 Indeed, public administration scholars foresee the need for such an “upgrade” 
(Miller, 2005; Hoch, 2006).  Sementelli observed that, “authority in contemporary 
society has shifted from its roots in positivism, logic, and rationalism, toward one 
grounded in symbols and language games leading to a number of consequences for 
the administrative state” (2007, p. 117).  Catlaw (2006) warns of some of these 
consequences, stating that, “government, both in its formulative and executive 
moments, comes to be experienced as a mechanism of exclusion and imposition” (p. 
265).  This thesis promotes neopragmatism as an alternative approach to 
administrative authority and duly explores the consequences that result from the 
“upgrade” of governance.  Furthermore, the idea of the epistemic community (Miller 
& Fox, 2001, 2007; Misak, 2007, 2008; Pierson, 1994) will be presented to support 
the neopragmatist approach. 
 The primary task is developing an understanding of neopragmatism from its 
major proponent.  Building on his acquaintance with Dewey’s pragmatism, Rorty 
advanced the progressive idea past the analytical school and into the throes of post-
modernity.  The equating of truth to utility is upgraded by neopragmatism to consider 
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 the socio-political, linguistic, and contextual influences on the definition of 
usefulness.  Whereas classical pragmatism advanced an agenda of discovery and 
revision in its search for utility, neopragmatism questions whether utility can ever be 
pinned down without holding out some fixed meanings that will divide society around 
its definition.  The “utility” agenda is not abandoned out of nihilistic frustration for 
neopragmatists, however, as there is still the thrill of the chase for democratic 
societies that seek to make things better. 
 A public relations problem for neopragmatism lies in the perception that it 
closely resembles anarchy.  It is thought to be differentiated from relativism only by 
the passing acquaintance with consensus and democracy as actual practices.  It is also 
charged with deconstructing ideas into meaninglessness and that its epistemological 
claims are nothing more than temporary fixes to language problems that are just a 
distraction from our experiences (Webb, 2004; Hildebrand, 2005; Shields, 2005).  
The resolution to this is that neopragmatism does not deny the raw materials of 
meaning, regardless of what we may call them (thus putting up a road sign to warn of 
the linguistic turns ahead), but cautions against making decisions that are only 
reasonable when justified through a particular final vocabulary.  A final vocabulary is 
necessarily recidivist, retarding progress, insofar as there is an end to the 
permutations of the language that can be contrived.  For rational empiricists, the end 
state of the permutations is the achievement of an ideal.  For neopragmatists, an end 
state is nonsense; perfecting a final vocabulary is not progress, it is totalitarianism. 
There is a recurring notion of “progress” in Rorty’s work that cannot be 
separated from his philosophy.  His use of the term is flexible but consistent in theme: 
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 “The end of human activity is not rest, but rather richer and better human activity” 
(Rorty, 1991, p.  39). He is continually looking to things that make our existence 
more interesting, open, and inclusive; yet if an idea comes to a dead end, then that is 
still alright for Rorty: “Social progress is not a matter of discovering the essential 
nature of the state or of one’s nation or of one’s society; it’s a matter of becoming a 
more rich, interesting society than in the past” (interview in McReynolds, 2007).  His 
view is purposive to the extent that humans should pursue these broad goals while 
moving away from the conventions that have previously served to marginalize ideas 
and created opportunities for exclusionary practices in society (1999, pp. 23-46).  
Philosophy, according to Rorty, “makes progress not by becoming more rigorous but 
by becoming more imaginative” (1998a, p. 8), and neopragmatism is an approach to 
solving problems, not discovering objective truths (1998a, p. 184).  Rorty maintains 
an idea of progress while still being a postmodernist; he confronts this apparent 
conflict repeatedly, armed with feel-good proposals for “community” that would be 
so much pabulum if not for his sincere hope for a better, more just human existence.   
The aggregate of Rorty’s work seems directed to address the very problem of 
contemporary discourse, succinctly stated by Spicer (1997): 
…the barriers to any meaningful sort of broad agreement on the substantive 
ends of the state and how best to accomplish them would seem daunting if not 
insurmountable.  Indeed, the postmodern condition and its plethora of 
incommensurable language games call into question the very meaningfulness 
of any talk about the substantive ends or purposes of a community. (p. 94). 
 
Rorty is not daunted by this challenge; in fact, he finds such problems interesting and 
worthwhile of human activity. 
 
 15
 1.3 Scope of Research 
 The focus of this dissertation requires a clear picture of the development of 
administrative authority and the ongoing discussion in the field.  The major topics 
within the discussion, public administration’s authority as a product of traditions, 
have not been analyzed exhaustively in the discussion and thus present the 
opportunity for this research.  I propose to explore the relationships of the topics 
under the heading of “authority” and then offer up the neopragmatist perspective on 
the discussion.  The evolutionary advancement of the American philosophy is due for 
a more detailed application to administrative authority. 
This research will seek evidence for its argument from two primary camps: 
the neopragmatism developed from three decades of Richard Rorty’s work and the 
public administration discourse on authority (Abel, 2007; Box, 2001; Catlaw, 2006; 
Eagan, 2007; Friedrich, 1958; Marshall, 2007; Raadschelders & Stillman, 2007; 
Sementelli, 2007).  The focus of this research is not to convince administrators that 
neopragmatism is all around us and just waiting to be acknowledged, but rather that a 
greater awareness of what it can offer may contribute to more effective governance. 
 Drawing on the literature of epistemic authority for public administration 
(Abel, 2007; Catlaw, 2006; Marshall, 2007; Miller & Fox, 2001; Raadschelders & 
Stillman, 2007; Sundstrom, 2007), a thorough review of the place and implications of 
authority in democratic governance will be presented.  This research will provide 
fodder for the more philosophical facets of neopragmatism from Rorty to be 
transformed by the neopragmatist’s hammer into the epistemic qualities for 
governance (Miller & Fox, 2001; Pierson, 1994; Stivers, 2008a). 
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  As previously mentioned, the chapters of the dissertation will align with the 
objectives of the research.  Chapter 2, Public Administration and Authority, sets out 
to define metanarratives and describe the liberal constitutional context of American 
public administration.  It then presents the problematic traditions of administrative 
authority as technical expertise, representation, and practice before talking about how 
the problems of administrative authority are manifest today.  The third chapter, 
Neopragmatism and the Postmodern Forgery, uses the history of ideas approach to 
introduce the thesis’s philosophy, starting from the roots in classical pragmatism and 
progressing through postmodern linguistic concerns to Richard Rorty’s philosophy.  
Neopragmatism is discussed as being anti-authoritarianism and a method for 
facilitating social progress.  Chapter 4, Reshaping Authority for Neopragmatist 
Governance, begins to formulate the process of neopragmatism that is applied to the 
context and defining characteristics of authority.  The task is set to reconstruct public 
administration to integrate consensus and context into practice.  Finally, Chapter 5, 
The Neopragmatist Administrator, resets the context of governance in the epistemic 
community and offers a model of administrative authority with implications of the 
neopragmatists approach for governance. 
The implications of this research are treated as two inquiries that can be 
contrasted under the old metanarratives in light of the neopragmatist’s conception of 
administrative authority.  What is the effect on public administration practice?  What 
is the effect on the polity vis-à-vis governance and public interaction with 
bureaucracy?  To these ends, the contribution for public administration is a 
conception of neopragmatism as a process.  The process is open-ended and serves to 
 17
 facilitate conversation between administrators and the public as they work toward 
outcomes for social progress.  When the context is right – meaning that the policy 
guidance is open to reaching consensus – neopragmatism can be applied. 
 A note on terminology is in order to clarify usage: “pragmatic” is used to 
denote practical utility, whereas “pragmatist” indicates a modifier or agent of the 
philosophy of pragmatism.  “Neopragmatic” is rarely used to avoid confusion, as 
“neopragmatist” will suffice for the descriptor or agent of the philosophy of 
neopragmatism.  Two key terms – solidarity and consensus – require preemptive 
operational definitions that are consistent with the argument.  Solidarity, in contrast to 
consensus, is the recognition of participatory and inclusive conversation as the first 
philosophy of democracy; agreement for discourse toward progress but not actual 
consensus on truth.  Consensus is actual agreement, perhaps temporary, as a 
community comes to conclusions about their objectives and goals after establishing 
solidarity about the process as a means to progress. 
 
1.4 Method of Research 
 The dissertation design sets up a philosophical argument in support of a 
neopragmatist approach to administrative authority.  To establish the premises 
requires a method that is appropriate to integrating neopragmatism with the 
theoretical objective of a coherent understanding of authority.   The methodology for 
this research follows the model of political theory, taken as a line of inquiry that is 
interested in examining and shaping the structures of governance.  The inquiry may 
be considered as a series of literature reviews that recount the multitude of 
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 discussions stemming from the issue of administrative authority.  Political theory 
works well with neopragmatism in that it is open to integrating the broad context of a 
theory’s formulation in order to open up new possibilities, in contrast to the effort of 
scientific theory that seeks to fit the circumstances into the positivist mold (Wolin, 
1969, 2004).  The method of political theory is a generator of new and interesting 
ideas – it does not purport neutrality or correspondence to the objective – through a 
critical method that is intended to reflect the subject of inquiry.  As such, political 
theory can serve as the anvil upon which the neopragmatist’s hammer will forge the 
model of administrative authority. 
As Berlin indicated, “Among the problems which form the core of traditional 
political theory are those, for instance, of the nature of equality, of rights, law, 
authority, rules” (1961, p. 11); these problems are shared by public administration 
theorists, especially those who do not ascribe to the politics/administration 
dichotomoy.  He continues to advance political theory to be,  
Committed not only to the analysis of, but to the conclusions about the 
validity of, ideas of the good and the bad, the permitted and the forbidden, the 
harmonious and the discordant problems which any discussion of liberty or 
justice or authority or political morality is sooner or later bound to encounter 
(Berlin, 1961, p. 17). 
 
Waldo contended that public administration is inherently a topic for political 
theory (1984, p. x); as he saw it, political theory seeks to create “solutions to 
problems judged to be important and urgent.  Political theory is in a sense a by-
product; it is, on the whole a judgment of history, a label subsequently affixed” 
(1984, p. xxxiii).  Waldo’s perspective is certainly pragmatic in that the utility of the 
theory comes after its realization.  His perspective invites the joining of 
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 neopragmatism by recognizing that problems and outcomes are continually judged 
and earn the mantle of political theory subsequent to their practice.  Similarly and 
appropriate to the combination of the philosophy with the approach, neopragmatism 
does not promote fixed solutions but rather the continual practice that is perpetually 
open for reevaluation.  Neopragmatism as a supporting approach to the method of 
political theory propels the latter into the postmodern realm, suspending the force of 
metanarratives that may falsely lead efforts at solving problems into a tangle of pre-
existing constructs.   
The political theory does not stand alone, however, as the thesis requires a 
grounding of the transition from philosophy to practical theory.  The history of ideas 
– a research approach that considers the context of an idea as integral to the facets of 
the idea itself – supplements the theoretical endeavor.  The history of ideas will be 
employed to develop neopragmatism, more specifically the version accredited to 
Richard Rorty.  The history of ideas builds a thick description of political and social 
thought that public administration, as a field of inquiry, can utilize to position itself in 
the broader process of governance (Spicer, 2004).  This method is especially 
appropriate for this research in that ideas, when formulated for widespread 
dissemination to the public, are wholly embodied in language.  Neopragmatism’s 
concern with the role of language in our knowledge implies a deep contextual 
framework, confirming Spicer’s (2004) contention that,  
No matter how carefully we try to separate the political and social ideas that 
have been and continue to be expressed in our culture from our views on 
public administration, the task is close to impossible.  Indeed, much of the 
vocabulary we use in public administration acquires meaning only in the 
context of the particular mental frameworks or categories of thought that we 
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 have come to use over time in thinking about and making sense of 
government actions (p. 354). 
 
Neopragmatism, as the guiding philosophy for the political theorizing 
conducted herein, proposes administrative authority to be one of these structures of 
governance that prompts continual inquiry and new approaches that are coherent with 
the context of its activity.  The methodologies may be considered as intrinsic to the 
philosophy; the unique relationship of neopragmatism, political theory, and the 
history of ideas will be played out both explicitly and implicitly in the dissertation. 
Finally, several key terms will be developed and established for the 
philosophical argument.  The process of explication, a measured method for defining 
the nature and stipulations of a term’s usage (Carnap, 1950), is employed for those 
moments.  The root of the term comes from notions of unfolding a message, revealing 
the implicit, and “reading between the lines”.  Explication also refers to the outcome 
(meaning of the term) that has been explicated, i.e.  an explication of neopragmatism 
will yield an explication just as defining neopragmatism will yield a definition.  For a 
philosophical explication, in contrast to the scientific process of Carnap, explication 
makes the subtext explicit; it serves as a heuristic tool (Moustakas, 1990).  The 
rationale behind explication is suitably pragmatic in that the outcome is the contextual 
utility of the term with a bounded value.  It works similarly, but on a smaller scale, as 
the history of ideas and political theory work to provide understandings of big ideas 
and political theories, respectively.  Thus, the gestalt of this research’s methods is of a 
singular vector aimed at providing interpretive understandings in context. 
 
 
 
 21
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND AUTHORITY 
The source of authority of regimes is the founding act itself. (Rohr, 1986, p. 
179). 
 
An extravagant belief in human reason is apt to lead (as it has led in the past) 
to extravagant claims on behalf of authority.  But the reach of authority is 
forever confined to the reach of reasoning.  There can be no absolute, no total 
authority, because there does not exist any absolute truth or total reason.  
(Friedrich, 1958, p. 47). 
 
Authority has been defined as: “the capacity to evoke compliance in others” 
(Presthus, 1960, p. 86) and “the power to make decisions which guide the actions of 
another” (Simon, 1997, p. 179).  Spiro works out the administrative relationship by 
positing authority as “the reasons why policy is accepted” (1958, p. 49).  From the 
vantage of democratic philosophy, Singer (1999) calls authority, “legitimacy and 
deserving to be taken seriously” (p. 158) and extends the idea to communal authority 
as, “the entitlement of every community engaged in interaction with others (thus 
joined with them in a more inclusive community) to have a voice in determining the 
way their joint activities and interactions are to be governed” (p. 160).  Authority 
connotes “the communications of a person possessing it [to] exhibit a very particular 
kind of relationship to reason and reasoning.  Such communications… possess the 
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 potentiality of reasoned elaboration – they are ‘worthy of acceptance’” (Friedrich, 
1958, p. 35, italics in original).  Raadschelders and Stillman (2007) capture some of 
the history of authority: 
In Antiquity authority is regarded both as an individual property (in terms of 
individual possession) and as something that manifests itself in a specifically 
designated place.  To this is added in early modern Europe the understanding 
that authority is an impersonal property of an officeholder…In the course of 
the eighteenth century and especially under the influence of Rousseau, 
authority is conceptualized as invested in and emanating from the people.  
Finally, in the course of the twentieth century attention turns more and more 
to authority as process.  (p. 16, italics in original). 
 
In the pragmatist school, Peirce analyzed the “method of authority” in his 
1877 essay, “The Fixation of Belief” (in Menand, 1997, pp. 7-25).  He discussed how 
authority “functions as an institutional expression of thought” (Diggins, 1994, p. 186) 
that can add force to the convictions of factions in a society.  Authority then denotes 
the subjection of some to those who protect the doctrines that codified their shared 
interests. 
Yet these definitions of authority – all of which rely upon those exercising 
such authority to have epistemic access to a higher source – are rightfully challenged 
by Rorty: “All attempts to name an authority which is superior to that of society are 
disguised moves in the game of cultural politics” (2007a, p. 8).  In the effort to 
position authority as the product of inter-subjective agreement, rather than reasoned 
persuasion, Rorty charges that, “The so-called ‘authority’ of anything other than the 
community (or some person or thing or expert culture authorized by the community 
to make decisions in its name) can only be more table-thumping” (2007a, p. 9). 
This chapter sets out the problem of authority when viewed as a tradition 
within the metanarrative of public administration.  Harmon (2006) provides a 
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 precedent for this analysis with his efforts to blur the pervasive dichotomies in the 
traditional public administration narrative which he hoped would, “remove the 
conceptual impediments to imagining an alternative – and more authentically mature 
– approach to governance” (p. 2).  Yet whereas Harmon worked to dissolve dualisms 
within the narrative, the problem at hand is to deflate the metanarrative of authority 
that has shaped public administration in the American state. 
There are pervasive traditions within the metanarrative that have shaped 
administrative authority in American governance: expertise as the warrant of 
authority, public administration as a form of democratic representation, and the idea 
of public administration as a practice.  These traditions and the methods of their 
justifications for practice are boundaries to social progress.  There is significant 
overlap in the traditions and their inter-dependence when put in the context of the 
American liberal constitutional state.  Any attempt to deflate one requires a challenge 
to the other, as well as a rethinking of how our administrative context is considered.  
Thus, when the incoherencies of public administration in contemporary society are 
laid out, they will have been developed from a chain of logic that makes the 
conclusions imminent from the public problems.  The existence of the metanarratives 
is not pernicious in itself, but the adherence to grand paradigms in contexts that 
rightfully challenge their utility does require inquiry that is separate from the methods 
contained within those metanarratives.  In other words, there is a need to examine the 
metanarrative from beyond its own boundaries, employing an approach that is not 
revisionary or reformative but altogether revolutionary. 
 24
 An explication of metanarratives is provided to situate the problem of 
authority as an untenable idea when it is broadly utilized in the liberal constitutional 
state.  The conversation about metanarratives starts with Hannah Arendt (2000) and 
Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984); they describe the threats to democratic society posed 
by the grand traditions that have endured up to this time.  Looking specifically at the 
metanarrative of public administration, the conversation then focuses on figures in the 
discipline who have discussed authority, from Carl Friedrich (1958; 1963) and 
Herbert Simon (1997) to McSwite (1997) and a host of contemporary scholars.  The 
context of the metanarrative as the liberal constitutional state is supported from the 
conversation that started with the Founders and continues through the classical 
pragmatists and on to public administration scholars such as John Rohr (1986; 1998) 
and Michael Spicer (2003; 2007a; 2007b).   
 Before parsing metanarratives and traditions of administrative authority, some 
attention to “authority in general” (Arendt, 2000, p. 463) is in order.  Authority 
carries connotations of power relations and organizational behavior in any context.  
People respect authority as a concept as well as those who hold, exercise, or 
otherwise wield authority over them.  Authority can be rightful, usurped, assigned, or 
misappropriated.  The root word – author – suggests that authority rests in the one 
who creates it, i.e. the first claims to power are legitimate in their originality.  From 
the humanistic perspective, we need authority; religion, social organization, and 
political structures are constructs of authority that provide meaning and purpose in 
our lives.  “Authority, resting on a foundation in the past as its unshaken cornerstone, 
gave the world permanence and durability which human beings needs precisely 
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 because they are mortals,” writes Arendt (2000, p. 465).  Authority is thus given 
substance by historical legacy and buttressed by traditional knowledge structures that 
resist questioning its foundations.  Rational empiricism, the use of past experience 
and reason to prove causality, serves to support these notions of authority.  As the 
final chapters will show, however, this scheme is suspect under postmodern critique 
and untenable in contemporary public administration. 
Administrative authority is a concept that includes the elements of 
justification and accountability.  It stands above and before justification because 
without an agent to carry out governance, there is no need for authority.  It is 
dependent on accountability in the sense that authority depends on consent which, in 
turn, requires commensurability between what is expected and what is delivered.  The 
issue in a free society is the justification for the activity carried out under our consent 
of governance.  “Authority implies an obedience in which men retain their freedom,” 
writes Arendt (2000, p. 474).  Raadschelders and Stillman (2007) note that, “In the 
study of public administration, administrative authority is a non-subject, although 
implicit attention for it is widespread” (p. 15).  This is different from administrative 
accountability, which is the correspondence of practices to the agreed upon guidelines 
of behavior and the chain of events that can testify between the acts and the orders.   
Justification, on the other hand, speaks to the reasoning for the actual content 
of the policy and how that content is interpreted for the practice.  Misak (2008) 
discusses the “culture of justification” in the pragmatist conception of democracy, 
meaning that we have come to expect that all actions should have reasonable, 
commensurable explanations that are provided upon demand.  American public 
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 administration finds its justification in the discourse that occurs between the 
Constitution and the polity.  Accountability exists after that discourse transpires, as 
the agencies act to support the ideas that emerged and maintain the relevancy of those 
acts to the ideas. 
Looking back to the first iterations of American government, Hendel 
describes it as a virtual “successor authority” to British rule and that, “those first 
Americans still regarded authority with a jealous eye, wary and fearful of it in any 
guise” (1958, p. 4).  The Founders’ ideas were reactive responses to British authority 
and thus their conception of authority was to carefully situate it as a documented and 
specialized instance for power and control.  As Stivers (2008a) sees it,  
The system the founders set up had the effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy: By 
creating government with its centers of power remote and inaccessible to most 
citizens, they made sure that people would remain relatively uninvolved in 
governance, therefore ignorant about issues, unpredictable, and mistrustful of 
public authority. (p. 4). 
 
Thomas Gordon, writing Cato’s Letter #38 (1721), presents a perspective on 
authority as a qualified factor of trust: “What is government, but a trust committed by 
all, or the most, to one, or a few, who are to attend upon the affairs of all, that every 
one may, with the more security, attend upon his own?” This early view offers that 
governance is activity carried out with the trust of citizens, equal to a deferential 
granting of authority to handle those affairs that allow us to conduct our own 
business.  Until the 20th century ushered in the field of public administration, the 
authority of government remained fixed in this liberal constitutional construct.  Spiro 
(1958, p. 54) observed that, “In western political systems, a shift of emphasis from 
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 substantive to procedural sources of authority seems often to have occurred in the 
course of time.”  Catlaw (2007a) affirms this observation: 
With the Enlightenment the ground of authority shifted from a positional, 
personal, and “embodied” authority to an essentially “representational” form 
in which authoritative speech found its force not in its connection with the 
past, tradition, or divine origins, but in the representation of either natural or 
scientific processes or a presumptive social consensus that justified the 
imposition of an overarching normative framework for decision and 
exclusion.  (p. 102). 
 
In the recent history of public administration discourse, Friedrich (1958, 1963) 
credits the classical Roman usage and develops authority from ideas of tradition, 
legitimacy, and community by hearkening back to the political theories of the 
modernists like Rousseau, Hume, and Locke.  He raises the analogy with the parent-
child relationship and prescribes “replacing subjection by understanding” by the wise 
parent who “will respond to the questions ‘why?’ and ‘wherefore?’ and seek to 
develop in the child an understanding of, a participation in, the reasons which 
animate the parent in asking for obedience as well as for agreement” (Friedrich, 1958, 
p. 34).  He appeals to reason as the warrant of authority and suggests that the sharing 
of the rationalization for authority can make it acceptable (Friedrich, 1963, p. 218), 
continuing to propose the idea of authority as consensual – the result of reasoned 
elaborations and a “quality of communications” (p. 224, italics in original) that are 
coherent with, “the opinions, values, beliefs, interests and needs of the community 
within which the authority operates” (p. 226).  Friedrich (1958) is decidedly 
rationalist in his approach, proposing that: 
…When we say X possesses authority, we thereby propose to suggest that the 
communications which X addresses to A, B, and C are based upon reasoning 
that has meaning not only to X, but also to A, B, and C, in the sense of being 
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 related to knowledge which they all possess, or to opinions, beliefs, and 
values which they all share. (p. 36). 
 
Despite the clarity of Friedrich’s explanations, his conception of authority is 
still dependent on measures of correspondence.  The reasoning process he lauds is, at 
the final logical operation, coming to a “correct” representation of reality for 
administrators to show to the public and satisfy the requirements of accountability.  
Yet he does credit that authority is effective when used in a context of shared 
knowledge as evidenced on the qualification that the members understand the 
communications.   
The traditional concepts of authority ultimately embody less democratic 
participation and more of a public spectacle of coercion and persuasion performed on 
a common ground.  Catlaw (2007a, p. 102) says that the tradition of authority “served 
a number of critical social functions” that were “past-oriented and concerned with 
preservation.”  He asserts that, “Traditional authority was self-referential: tradition 
grounded authority and, in turn, authority was grounded in tradition.  The problem of 
what grounds authority was answered by its very existence” (p. 103).  This is the very 
point at which Arendt sees the crisis: “If authority is to be defined at all, then, it must 
be in contradistinction to both coercion by force and persuasion through arguments” 
(2000, p. 463).  Her prescription is a hammer blow to the cornerstone of the 
metanarrative by noting that the modern world no longer holds external foundations, 
such as religion and traditions, above question.  Subsequently, the warrants for 
authority resting on that cornerstone are chipped loose. 
Shifting to the public administration perspective, authority is often ascribed in 
the Weberian model (1984) that provided legitimacy through developments of 
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 bureaucratic science and structure.  Weber saw legitimate modern authority as the 
culmination of a process that began with charismatic authority (i.e. a leader) being 
transformed into traditional authority (a lineage) over time and usage before the 
imputing of scientific approaches to achieve the apotheosis of rational-legal authority 
as a foundational product (Weber, 1984, pp. 33-34).  Furthermore, Weber imputes 
organizational structure with an element of authority, as noted by Raadschelders and 
Stillman (2007): “Weber defines authority as accepted and thus legitimate power 
exercised by identifiable individuals.  Hence, authority is a type, a species, or 
manifestation of power, the exercise of which is believed to be accepted” (p. 7).  The 
very existence of a formal bureaucracy is an edifice for authority, and a formal 
authority is often ensconced in a bureaucratic structure.  This perspective then forces 
any challenge of the particular use of authority as a challenge to the whole structure 
that houses the authority.  The task is akin to disputing governance as a whole when 
the issue is only with a particular policy.  This wagon-circling defense of authority as 
a structural characteristic of bureaucracy makes it much harder to break it up and 
revise the use of authority on a case-by-case basis; Weber’s notion of authority can 
only be challenged with a full-fledged revolt against bureaucracy itself. 
Using authority as a mechanism for legitimacy in the modern state maintains 
governance as something above those who are subject to agents of authority, as well 
as beyond the agents themselves.  In other words, public administrators are not active 
participants in the formation of authority but, instead, they are temporary wielders of 
the authority that comes from ethereal origins in reality that allow momentary 
utilization when the office requires such legitimacy.  Schaar (1984) states that 
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 “natural human authority has been overwhelmed by the combined impact of the very 
forces, structures, and intellectual and moral orientations that we identify with 
modernity” (p. 124). 
 Although the divisive dichotomies in public administration are targets of this 
critique, Weber’s conflation of authority and power is not wholly appropriate in this 
work.  Most definitions of authority include power as the operationalizing element, 
but the emphasis here is on public administration’s legitimacy as distinct from the 
tautological conception that puts authority and power as interchangeable warrants.  
As Oakeshott (1975) divides it, “A modern state…had three distinct features that it 
has never lost: an office of authority, an apparatus of power, and a mode of 
association” that supports the distinction proposed: “And by the acknowledgement of 
authority I do not mean approval of what is prescribed or the recognition of power to 
enforce prescriptions; I mean the recognition of an antecedent right to prescribe” (p. 
1346).  Oakeshott considers the modern state as a product of discourse, “a history of a 
succession of beliefs about authority” (p. 1347).  His perspective is appropriated here 
to keep the conversation about administrative authority separate from the politics of 
power and concentrated more on the process of authority (Raadschelders & Stillman, 
2007) needed for governance to proceed at an epistemic level in our “culture of 
justification” (Misak, 2008). 
 
2.1 Metanarratives 
Public administration’s standard narrative is the “governance chapter” of 
modernity’s metanarrative…The modern metanarrative’s tale of progress 
ends unhappily with the twentieth century’s unremitting succession of 
cataclysms and disasters… (Harmon, 2006, pp. 145-146). 
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  Metanarratives are the overarching, axiomatic foundations for explaining 
behavior that are the focus of postmodern critique.  They inform current practices by 
virtue of their assumed gravity and permanence in a community.  An institutional, 
organizational, or systemic metanarrative is the collection of traditions and practices 
that have developed over time from continued reliance on foundations that are tested 
in the world.  As a paradigmatic, a metanarrative is followed to the extent that it is 
able to justify what we do within a system.  The timeline of its development and the 
content of its explanations are both the artifacts and the catalysts of its content.  In 
other words, a metanarrative has a starting point in some foundations (whether that is 
a conscious embarkation or not is immaterial) which are themselves contextually 
formed.  From that point, the causal order between the content of the metanarrative 
and the context of its use becomes blurred.   
Arendt (2005) explored the confluence of practical traditions and political 
authority, writing that, “it lies in the nature of a tradition to be accepted and absorbed, 
as it were, by common sense, which fits the particular and idiosyncratic data of our 
other senses into a world we inhabit together and share in common” (p. 41).  The 
traditions – repeated common sense practice in response to a context of familiar or 
shared experiences – that form from these relationships between context and activity 
feed into what becomes a metanarrative that expands to the limits of its sound 
justifications for continued adherence to its traditions.  Yet there are terminals 
whereby the traditions cannot serve our interests and those practices become weak 
points of the metanarrative.  Old practices based on common sense can lead to 
moments of incoherency: “when traditional standards cease to make sense and no 
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 longer serve as general rules under which all or most particular instances can be 
subsumed, common sense unavoidably atrophies” (Arendt, 2005, p. 42). 
 Thus a world dominated by metanarratives offers limited practices that 
eventually enforce a set of conservative values – in this case meaning the desire for 
the predictability of a tradition and resistance to change – that may not hold up as the 
world changes in ways not explained by the grand story.  Bacon (2006), discussing 
social criticism as “an interpretive activity…focusing attention on the ways in which 
a society’s practices fail to live up to its self image” (p. 863) notes that “Rorty argues 
that the attempt to provide foundations can be a conservative desire” (p. 875).   He 
charges that the desire “threatens to become the attempt to shore up the views of the 
day by assuming a fixed set of questions to be discussed in a language that is already 
available” (Bacon, 2006, p. 875).  Rorty supports the view that, “investigations of the 
foundations of knowledge or morality or language or society may be simply 
apologetics, attempts to eternalize a certain contemporary language-game, social 
practice, or self image” (1979, p. 9-10).   
We may not be able to step outside the metanarrative to critique its 
foundations if everything known up to now has been a product of the system; there is 
no point from which we can deflate the metanarrative without borrowing some of its 
own terms.  Rorty said as much in promoting a postmodern perspective:  
The view that every tradition is as rational or as moral as every other could be 
held only by a god, someone who had no need to use (but only to mention) the 
terms ‘rational’ or ‘moral,’ because she had no need to inquire or deliberate.  
Such a being would have escaped from history and conversation into 
contemplation and metanarrative.  (1991, p. 202). 
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 The effort is nonetheless necessary due to the shortsightedness of our behavior 
and the confluence of external factors that are not part of the scheme to which we are 
accustomed.  Just as Kuhn (1996) advised as a workaround to the impossibility of the 
Archimedean vantage, we may wish to “adopt new instruments and look in new 
places” as well as “see new and different things when looking with familiar 
instruments in places [we] have looked before” (p. 111).  Kuhn’s notion of the 
revolutionary paradigm shift may not wholly reverse or reject a set of values derived 
from a metanarrative, but it may open up a new description (or redescription) that still 
reaches back to some part of the foundation.  As the theme of postmodernism posits, 
the mistrust of rationality is not answered by more rationality. 
Lyotard (1984) drew attention to metanarratives as a misleading source of 
legitimating with particular “incredulity” to the adequacy of any knowledge claims 
based on such schemes of categorizing and institutionalizing knowledge (pp. xxiii-
xxv).  Spicer (1997) observed that, “central to postmodern thinking is the idea that 
there has been a decline in the credibility or legitimating power of the grand 
narratives or stories, which we are used to telling each other” (p. 90).  There may be 
nothing inherently insidious about a metanarrative, yet an unchallenged appeal to 
tradition in the face of contemporary issues should always raise questions of 
appropriateness.   
The challenge to metanarratives in public administration is no less than 
balking at bureaucratic inertia and expressing concern with the maxim of “that’s the 
way we’ve always done it.” Knowing full well that contexts and circumstances 
change, the probability that a long-held tradition or provincial justification for some 
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 administrative behavior is eminently valid in the face of progress is duly at risk.  
Arendt (2005) saw the hazards of forcing traditions into incommensurable 
experiences – i.e. using a hammer to pound everything down regardless if it is a nail 
or a screw – such that, “the mere tendency to exclude everything that was not 
consistent developed into a great power of exclusion, which kept the tradition intact 
against all new, contradictory, and conflicting experiences” (p. 47).  The protectors of 
tradition were upholding an authority that sought to discount the validity of others 
experiences because those experiences would not correspond to the tradition’s notion 
of the way things should be.  In other words, public administration does not occur in a 
vacuum; the changing political, economic, and social environments cannot be 
addressed by the public sector if it is itself a century-old product of the traditions of 
practice, representation, and expertise that rely on an unyielding metanarrative for 
authority. 
 Metanarratives have been the target of postmodern discourse, as Miller and 
Fox (2007) observe: 
The thinning of superstructural metanarratives has been the main work of 
philosophy in the last half of the twentieth century.  As Rome was battered 
and finally destroyed by successive waves of barbarians, so has the 
Foundationalist/modern metanarratives canon been battered by Nietzsche, 
pragmatists, existentialists, phenomenologists, semioticians, poststructuralists, 
deconstructionists, hermeneuticists, and more. (p. 60). 
 
It is interesting to note that Miller and Fox, like Arendt (2000; 2005), aim their lens 
back to the Roman Empire to open the critique of metanarratives.  Her analysis of the 
ancient regime as a consolidation of authority from religious, traditional, and political 
foundations accuses that, “It preserved and handed down authority, which was based 
on the testimony of the ancestors who had witnessed the sacred foundation” and 
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 conveyed “the sacred binding force of an authoritative beginning to which one 
remained bound through the strength of tradition” (pp. 49-50).  History shows that the 
record of human accomplishment under the mantle of rationality rises and falls, just 
as the drama of Rome unfolded under the massive inertia of the empire and its 
codification. 
The import of the Roman analogue to the preeminence of rational thought is 
not lost in the critique of public administration; the discipline of governance can be 
paralleled with enough reference points to argue that the critique of the grand 
metanarrative of modern rationality may be applied to a critique of the overarching 
metanarratives of public administration.  This critique has already started (Bogason, 
2001; Farmer, 1995; Hummel, 2007; Miller & Fox, 2007; McSwite, 1997; Spicer 
1997, 2003, 2007b) with scholars who see the need to examine the roots of 
administrative behavior apart from the modern rationalist system that has prevailed in 
studies of the discipline.   
As the specter was placed on these grand traditions and systems of thought by 
Arendt after World War II, Lyotard’s (1984) explication of metanarratives in the 
realm of human knowledge showed them to be difficult targets.  Our very existence – 
indeed, the first conscious thought that we have – is already ensconced in the modern 
rationalist scheme.  This involuntary condition is explained by the dichotomous 
nature of rationalism itself; to declare oneself as anti-rationalist is a concession to 
rationalism’s prevalence.  The aforementioned postmodern public administration 
critics view governance to be similarly protected; public administration was created 
out of modern rationalism and is conducted within the system that it serves, despite a 
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 “decline in the credibility or in the legitimating power of the grand narratives” 
(Spicer, 2001, p. 89).  For example, McSwite’s (1997) review of the “misfounding” 
of public administration concludes that, “No point of view, such as pragmatism, that 
went outside the assumptions of the founding Federalist worldview could be 
incorporated into the theory of public administration” (p. 150).  Public administration 
is mired in an intellectual tradition defended by the “Man of Reason” (McSwite, 
1997) who repels “alterity” (Farmer, 1995, p. 227) and has heretofore maintained 
boundaries to any encroachment by “otherness” (p. 273).  The insulated logic of 
administrative activity is thus self-justified at the outset of any policy proposal and 
any limits to the extension of logic, such as Simon’s observation of “bounded 
rationality” (1997), are gamely accepted.   
The system has been unable to deal with the issues that appear outside the 
system but are nonetheless demanded of public service, such as creating financial 
regulations to address creative financing instruments that sought to work outside the 
banking constructs of the 1990s.  These moments of incoherency – the point where 
the tools do not resemble the material or people manage to “cheat the system” – 
require a large step back to reconsider the obstacle.  If modern rationalist public 
administration cannot solve today’s problems, then the institution needs to be revised, 
opened, and otherwise reconsidered from the foundations and metanarratives to 
which it has been bound. 
Administrative authority is a pragmatic issue in democracy; it characterizes 
the relationship between the sovereign and the state and “It is authority that gives an 
organization its formal structure” (Simon, 1997, p. 177).  It is impossible to imagine 
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 the practice of governance without immediately hypothesizing how things could be 
practically accomplished, which necessarily requires contemplation on the means of 
governance as “real world” applications and relationships between administration and 
society.  “We are born into a world where relationships of authority exist everywhere 
and are taken for granted,” says Abel (2007), “Rather than being understood as 
transient makeshifts, they are clung to as either natural or necessary” (p. 58).   
 
2.2 A Context of Liberal Constitutionalism 
In a word, there is a need for a normative theory of public administration that 
is grounded in the Constitution…The administrative state must not forfeit its 
administrative character in order to achieve constitutional legitimacy. (Rohr, 
1998, p. 87). 
 
The strict sense of public administration in the liberal constitutional state is 
that its authority lies in the document; the power and right to implement policy is 
described by the Constitution insofar as the polity requires some regulation over its 
freedoms.  Such authority is a constrained power given to administrators from the 
lawmakers and it is justifiable via transitive operations under the instruction of the 
political masters.  Whether public administration finds its authority through a textual, 
originalist, or public values approach to the Constitution (Spicer & Terry, 1996), the 
context of the liberal constitutional state has informed public administration from the 
outset. 
“American public administration is based on the proposition that government 
decisions and activities should follow the rule of law… [which] is the basis of liberty” 
(Rosenbloom, Carroll, & Carroll, 2000, p. xv).  This proposition has been satisfying 
to the polity because the written policies and regulations are the result of its 
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 democratic mechanisms (vagaries of the accuracy of representation aside) that the 
public administrators are carrying out.  Administrators are well-versed in regulation 
and, content of the regulations or policies withstanding, they are expected to be 
experts in the context of the liberal constitutional state in which they function.  
Knowledge of the regulations and parameters of governance is a form of authority in 
the sense of being able to accurately refer to the documents that lay out the form and 
functions of public administration.  This form of administrative authority is 
essentially the concept of constitutional authority trickled down to street-level 
practice.  This is a pragmatic authority so long as the activity is producing outcomes 
that are useful without violating the sensibilities of the polity.  All of the grounding 
factors that allow for administrative authority in this portrayal assume correspondence 
between governance and the constitutional principles.  Rohr (1998) puts it together as 
follows: 
For public administrators, the Constitution is the cause above causes.  In 
exercising discretionary authority to support this policy or that one, their 
judgment should be informed by the constitutional needs of the time, as well 
as by the… myriad other matters that clamor for the attention of the public 
administration.  The link between subordination to constitutional masters and 
the freedom to choose among them preserves both the instrumental character 
of public administration and the autonomy necessary for professionalism.  (p. 
89). 
 
The realization of authority is not so clear in practice, however, as the 
contingencies of each application of a regulation or a policy broaden the 
interpretation of authority that is required.  The public administrator is not always 
granted the license to utilize lengthy derivations of practice from constitutional 
foundations, nor is such an approach appropriate in many situations.  The closed 
relationship between administrators and the rule of law is exclusionary, as well, thus 
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 stifling the, “process of collaborative inquiry and learning [from which] proper 
warrants of authority arise” (Abel, 2007, p. 73).   
The implementation of policies and regulations with consideration to 
influences (i.e. prevailing contingencies) beyond constitutional principles requires 
discretion – akin to the judicial prerogative of review and interpretation – which 
emphasizes interaction with the situation and requires a modicum of independent 
authority for justification and accountability.  The discretion of administrators is 
another facet of their expertise and thus a support of their authority when agreeably 
applied.  Not only are they supposed to be experts (and possessing authority) in 
matters of constitutional principles and the policies that are rooted in such principles 
(Rohr, 1986; Rosenbloom, Carroll & Carroll, 2000), but they are also granted 
expertise (and the authority) to apply the principles as they see fit.  In other words, the 
context and contingency upset the correspondence theory that linked the practice of 
governance to documents when the problem requires an approach other than 
regulatory means.  Again, if the purpose of public administration is posed to be the 
confrontation of public problems, then unless the constitutional framework is 
expansive enough to anticipate all conceivable problems (which it is evidently not, 
considering the number of amendments), public administration must have a more 
flexible and open charter.  Miller and Fox (2007) regard constitutional grounding to 
be, “the sort of universalizing claim or grand narrative that postmodernism posits as 
incredulous.  Foundationalist claims are but strategically crafted metanarratives” (p. 
78).  This is the challenge: to deny the legitimacy of correspondence to objective 
reality, remove ideas of Truth from practice, dissolve elite epistemes, debunk the 
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 empirical approach to representation, and bypass the metanarrative in the pursuit of a 
real and satisfying democracy. 
 
2.3 Traditions of Administrative Authority 
As the problem is centered on the expiration of traditional understandings of 
administrative authority, the critique must begin with the discussion of authority from 
the traditional public administration vein, the metanarrative that must be deflated.  
“Attention given to administrative authority at large in the study of public admini-
stration in the past four decades has dwindled to nothing,” comment Raadschelders 
and Stillman (2007, p. 5, italics in original).  This section describes three prevailing 
concepts of administrative authority as the major traditions of the metanarrative.   
Authority has been included in any notion of governance – from both liberal 
and conservative perspectives – for as long as societies have existed.  White (in 
Wamsley et al., 1990, p. 184) attacks the classical conservative notion as an 
obedience to “defer to the set of traditions, and the stable institutions through which 
they are expressed, that define the social order” and the classical liberal notion of 
authority as honoring the, “rational, conscious contract as the basis for banding 
together into society so as to create order and the security that flows for it.”  Intoning 
the pessimistic, if not misanthropic, Hobbesian view of communities, he continues, 
“Hence, authority is seen as a necessary evil.  Danger is seen as inherent in the act of 
granting authority to government and every precaution must be taken in doing so” 
(1990, p. 184).  Abel (2007, pp. 62-63) echoes these criticisms, noting that the 
classical liberal notion of authority from Locke’s political philosophy is the 
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 counterbalance to the Hobbesian view; authority is warranted as a protection of 
liberties.  This hearkens back to the main problem stated earlier: administrative 
authority and democratic society are at incoherent odds.  From either perspective, the 
call for a careful examination of administrative authority is prescient on the grounds 
that neither approach gives sufficient service to hopes of individual freedom and 
democratic participation. 
Analyzing authority in the tradition is a grand task that may be attempted by 
replicating the prevailing categories used in public administration theory, which tends 
to concentrate on three strains: representation, expertise, and practice.  The order of 
the traditions reflects their respective prominence in public administration’s history, 
rather than a cardinal order of relative influence on the metanarrative of authority.  
Expertise is construed as the dominant tradition that sometimes overlaps and 
encompasses some of the aspects of the traditions of public administration as 
representation or practice.  Representation is a tenuous tradition in light of the 
perpetual changing of administrations and elected legislators (in contradistinction to 
the tenure of civil servants).  On the other hand, viewing public administration as 
practice is more professional but less democratic.  The drawbacks to both of these 
traditions are discussed more fully in the following, but suffice it to say that they both 
ultimately draw on the tradition of administrative authority as expertise, which will 
receive the most attention.  This analysis does not exhaust all variances for the seat of 
administrative authority, but it certainly confronts the problem at its sturdiest 
foundations.  Furthermore, these three views of administrative authority follow the 
history of the discipline in accordance with this research’s methodology. 
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 The problem of public administration as representation is found in the conflict 
between a liberal society and the need for government to provide services and 
protection to the public.  Wilson (1887) ventured the first iteration of public 
administration as the neutral implementation of the needs of the republic.  The 
provisions of government cannot be carried out under an idealistic notion of 
democracy; however, as practical considerations to performing the activities require 
encroachment on liberties to some degree: “the American representative system of 
government has set limits on how far direct citizen involvement can extend in 
practice” (Stivers, 2008b, p. 2).  From the very beginning, American democracy has 
been constrained by republican constructs formed in the interests of expediency.  
Representation itself, as discussed in the Federalist papers (Wootton, 2003), was a 
concession that marginalized citizen participation at many levels.  In “The Agency 
Perspective” Wamsley (in Wamsley et al., 1990, p. 117) portrays public 
administration as the agent of the people, citing the dictionary definition of agent and 
reinforcing that administrators are empowered to act for the people by the people’s 
authority to do so.  This gives rise to the problem of understanding public 
administration as the execution of the public will.  “Faith and trust in institutions and 
representatives of their authority have served not simply the function of providing 
social order but also in generating and sustaining identity itself,” writes Catlaw (2006, 
p. 268) in his exposition on post-traditional governance.  He discusses how authority 
is a pragmatic reference point for public administrators, yet it cannot be founded in 
claims of representation that necessarily imply fixed meanings of “We the People.” 
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  The second type of justification for administrative authority is the technical 
expertise that administrators are credited with bringing to governance.  Some types of 
expertise are unique to the role of public administrators and warrant authority by 
virtue of specialization, such as environmental regulatory enforcement, military 
contract management, or election processes.  These types of expertise can also be 
seen as vested in the office (Raadschelders and Stillman, 2007, p. 19) insofar as the 
bureaucrat holds a position because her qualifications are sufficient to the 
requirements of the office.  Yet there are pitfalls to the cold technicality of expertise: 
To the degree that the rational, expert administrative leader achieves the 
objectivity and expertise which are the badges of his competence, he loses the 
ability to enter a relationship of mutual understanding with those who rely on 
him for counsel and encouragement. (Schaar, 1984, p. 126). 
 
From the perspective of political economy, public administration performs these 
things because no other entity (i.e. private enterprise) can or will provide the requisite 
public good that they provide.  In these cases, public administration has “earned” 
authority because it is performing activities that are the singular purview of 
government and developing such technical expertise can only result from practice and 
training within the agency.  The authority from such expertise is related to the public 
needs and response by public administration to service those needs.  The authority to 
provide public service is functionally inherent in the idea of governance itself as the 
corollary to addressing public problems.  In this sense, administrative authority stems 
from the unique position and responsibility of the offices that enables the 
development of technical expertise and the accompanying episteme of the profession.  
We must defer authority to these matters because we have no referent for challenging 
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 the activity that public administration does when, for example, it comes to matters of 
national defense or environmental protection. 
Harmon (2006) classifies the skill of the administrator as an instrumental 
relation between theory and practice that “underwrites the notion of professional – 
and therefore politically neutral – expertise upon which the rationalists of public 
administration’s standard metanarrative ground the field’s claim to legitimacy” (p. 
107).  He continues by describing the instrumentalism of expertise as distinct from 
the political side of governance, much as Oakeshott (1975) separated the two:  
It may indeed be sensible to demand a high degree of certainty about the 
consequences of applying technical knowledge; but it is altogether another 
matter when that same demand is made of knowledge about social processes 
such as administration and policy making. (p. 111). 
 
The other prevalent argument for authority as expertise is found in the 
scientific character of public administration.  At the end of the 19th century, public 
administration theorists and practitioners adopted a self-fulfilling posture of being the 
arbiters of social rationality, meaning that the field defined itself as being the pinnacle 
of scientific methods – i.e. rational empiricism – applied to social issues.  This 
posture came from the work of efficiency and management experts like Frederick 
Taylor (1998), who believed that human behavior could be controlled and 
manipulated through the observation of causal relationships and strict procedural 
guidelines.  Taylor promoted the idea that authority came from one’s natural 
dispositions and training, shaped into technical aptitude or expertise for each position 
in an organization, then exercised by virtue of the administrator being “better fitted” 
for such work (p. 15).  This attitude toward dealing with the public supported the 
tradition of authority as expertise, as the rationality and methods of natural science 
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 were unduly imposed on social contexts.  The alignment of public administration’s 
ascent as a discipline and the popularity of scientific management fertilized the roots 
of social rationality for the next one hundred years. 
 Simon (1997) confirmed and formalized this understanding of administrative 
authority in the profession, focusing on the relationship between the superior and the 
subordinate as the defining characteristic.  His work affirmed some of Weber’s ideas 
and, although divisive to some theorists, was nonetheless the acme of public 
administration as a scientific discipline in the traditional conception.  Although Simon 
was primarily concerned with the exercise of authority within an organization, his 
contribution to the discussion in terms of the importance of expertise extends beyond 
the analysis of bureaucracy: “An extremely important function of authority is to 
secure decisions of a high quality of rationality and effectiveness” (1997, p. 188).   
His interest was in the performance of administration and the need for 
authority within the institution, yet the consequences affect the public as 
administration performs its duties in context.  As a public service, the structure of the 
institution has real implications on its ability to interact with the polity and therefore 
is influential on the discourse between citizens and public administration.  Thus, 
when Simon promotes specialization and technical expertise with emphasis on the 
placement of such administrators in offices where their talents will be effective, we 
must extend the position with inquiry as to how specialization and technical expertise 
affect the polity.  This is the relevance of Simon’s position to the argument: what 
goes on inside public administration in terms of authority needs to cohere with what 
goes on outside the bureaucracy, as well.  His positivist perspective reminds us that 
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 administrative authority exists in order to get things done; the more enlightened 
approaches to authority that support notions of community must not forget that the 
imposition of governance should be predicated with an idea of progress, if not 
purpose.  Again, the political-economic vantage would posit that if government must 
provide a service for the public good, then the delivery should be efficient and 
effective. 
An appeal to expertise implies a shared context that makes the expert's 
experience relevant, useful, and effective.  Evaluating what works requires some 
other input; Pierson states, “So we defer to the opinions of others, in hopes of 
learning from their experience and thereby supplementing the limited scope of our 
own” (1994, p. 398).  His position is based on the idea that we cannot practically have 
a broad enough scope to know what to do with all of the situations that may come our 
way.  The contexts must be commensurable at some point, which thus requires that 
the authority and the public be commensurable as well.  Abel (2007), in discussing 
the pragmatic implications of Carl Friedrich’s conception of authority, finds support 
for such an idea in the public administration discourse: 
People and institutions should only be recognized as legitimate authorities 
when they demonstrate the ability to generate directives founded upon reasons 
that derive from collaborative problem-solving, a process whereby knowledge 
gained through praxis of many and placed, through a wide-ranging and open 
discourse, in reflexive equilibrium with values, traditions, and goals that have 
themselves been collaboratively devised through the same process. (p. 57). 
 
Combining the ideas of Pierson and Abel make it clear that expertise as a form 
or characteristic of authority is a pragmatic concession by citizens when their interests 
lie beyond their rational capabilities.  If we consider some aspects of governance to 
be in that category, such as manufacturing regulations or interstate commerce, then 
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 Pierson’s warrant of authority in expertise for the “relatively closed system” (1994, p. 
404) is reasonable.  Furthermore, the potential contributions of expertise in the “open 
system” – meaning that administrators play an advisory role from their vantage of 
authority – is still valid, especially with regard to the Agential perspective that 
preserves participatory interaction of the polity with bureaucracy (Wamsley et al., 
1990, pp. 114-162). 
Rohr’s (1998) vision of public administration as constitutional gatekeeper is, 
at root, a practice focused on using, “discretionary powers in order to maintain the 
constitutional balance of powers in support of individual rights” (p. 88).  He views 
administrators as the politically neutral arbiters of competition between the branches 
of government and their practice is embodied in policy implementation answerable 
only to the constitutional principles in the oath of office.  Yet he cautions that practice 
“must not collapse into managerial utilitarianism” (p. 91), but rather that public 
administration is part of the constitutional order that serves to protect individual 
rights. 
Snider (2000b) contends that public administration practice as rooted in 
pragmatism “has come to mean mere practicality or expedience.  As a consequence, 
many in public administration may believe that they have a heritage in pragmatism 
and that this heritage means simply ‘doing what works’” (p. 125).  “Practices are 
those embodied ideographs that are well established and give action its sense of 
appropriateness.  Current practice has been authorized in the archives” (Miller & Fox, 
2007, p. 115). 
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 2.4 The Problem Manifest Today 
 The warrants of administrative authority have been protected by a common 
tradition that cannot withstand challenges from contemporary (much less post-
modern) notions of democratic society.  Public administration is still obligated to 
conduct governance, but the nagging objections to its authority and the continual 
aggregation of rules and regulations appear anathema to the principles of liberal 
democracy.  Indeed, some recent administrative “red tape” activities appear to be 
practices in enforcing authority for its own sake, as Sementelli (2007) observes: 
“Governmental actors, implicitly or explicitly seeking to maintain the authority of 
their position have begun to seek opportunities to exercise control using conceptions 
of authority most often seen in the realm of familial or religious contexts” (p. 123), 
much as a parent avoids articulating a full explanation when asserting authority with 
the commanding finality of “Because I said so.” 
Governance is bounded by institutional contingencies that dictate what is and 
is not allowed in the pursuit and protection of liberty, rather than the contingencies of 
our being and circumstances.  Miller and Fox (2007) criticize the accountability feed-
back loop model of governance as ignoring the effects of contingencies on practice, 
such effects leading to actual feedback – like the incoherent noise of an instrument in 
front of its amplifier – in the sense of meaninglessness.  Citing a case where pressures 
for an organization to meet reporting standards lead to manipulation of the feedback, 
they surmise that, “Reality, it turns out, is exceedingly difficult to measure or 
represent.  In public administration, the drive for empirical evidence mostly generates 
pressure for a good show amidst the atmospherics of accountability” (p. 15).   
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 Eagan (2007) is particularly suspicious of the value of authority altogether, 
especially when the actions of the state are predicated on exceptions to the rule of law 
(p. 86) and that such inversions of authority allows public administrators to, “lose 
sight of what the people want and are in positions where they [administrators] can do 
damage” (p. 87).   The result is a more constrained administrative practice that seeks 
to correspond to ideal (and realistically impossible) situations while slowly eroding 
democratic principles.  In other words, the foundations of administrative authority are 
vulnerable to contemporary and postmodern assaults.  Yet governance must carry on. 
Authority must then be situated in an appropriate theoretical position that 
allows for the traditional administrative goals of efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy, as well as accommodating the need for appropriateness.  Eagan proposes 
that, “authority as a concept is no longer desirable unless we can develop a notion of 
authority that is contingent and not absolute” (2007, p. 98).  Marshall adds that the 
evolution of society is demanding traditional authority structures to shift to “diffused 
structures that emphasize particularity” (2007, p. 112).  Thus, authority is ripe for 
reconsideration and realignment under the neopragmatist’s hammer. 
The current public administration discourse on authority is wrapped up in 
questions of accountability and legitimacy.  Recently, the discussion has been held at 
the 2008 Minnowbrook III conference; in an ongoing debate in Administration & 
Society; and in a symposium in Administrative Theory & Practice which has devoted 
considerable pages on the topic.  Some scholars suggest that progress toward an 
understanding of authority requires that we step back to discuss the framework in 
which authority will be placed (Marshall, 2007; Raadschelders & Stillman, 2007; 
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 Sementelli, 2007; Stivers, 2008b).  We will take these current views into 
consideration as it primes the discussion for the introduction of a neopragmatist 
model, including a review of the yet-to-be resolved status of (neo)pragmatism, in 
general, for public administration (Hildebrand, 2005, 2008; Hoch, 2006; Miller, 2004, 
2005; Shields, 2003, 2005, 2008; Webb, 2004). 
Metanarratives are shattered in the face of incommensurability, requiring a 
paradigm shift to explain that which does not fit in with dominant traditions (Kuhn, 
1996).  To illustrate how administrative authority is rooted in metanarratives, 
consider the oft-appealed-to bureaucratic axiom: “that is the way we have always 
done it.” Those who wield authority without a comprehensive understanding of its 
origins and legitimacy in context use such justification to mask the shortfall.  Worse 
than the lack of knowledge about the authority being exercised is the acceptance of 
authority by the same justification; history does not prescribe the correct application 
for future contexts.  Spiro (1958) shows this by reflecting on how a policy is right for 
the polity:  
The acceptance of policy as “right” by those who will be affected by its 
consequences may also be the result of a decision.  But in most cases, once a 
method of making policy or a maker of policy is accepted as right, the 
attachment of authority is likely to continue. (p. 50). 
 
This attachment to past practice and procedures, sometimes known as 
bureaucratic inertia, is an obvious target of reform theories and serves as an obvious 
embodiment of the negative qualities of a metanarrative.  Yet some of the traditions 
within metanarratives have positive contributions to public administration, 
particularly in terms of efficiency and the ability of agencies to be responsive in 
emergencies.  The traditions need to have a sense of temporary authority in the sense 
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 that they are merely historical examples of best practices that can guide contemporary 
discourse about how we go about solving problems.  Institutionalized practices avoid 
unnecessary review if they are applied carefully and can save effort in justification in 
the absence of specific challenges, but these are benefits that can only be realized in 
hindsight. 
Spicer (2005, p. 670) argues that, “the postmodern condition, by severely 
fragmenting our political culture, increases the incidence, as well as the visibility, of 
conflict between incompatible and incommensurable human ends or values.” He adds 
that the condition – which is accredited to Lyotard (1984, p. xxiv) as an “incredulity 
towards metanarratives” – then, “places significant limits on the role that 
conventional social science can play in providing guidance to public administration.” 
The end state is a public administration that certainly takes advantages of the 
strengths of empirical rational methods but does not assume them as the default 
approach to issues. 
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CHAPTER III 
NEOPRAGMATISM AND THE POSTMODERN FORGERY 
 
This chapter explores Richard Rorty’s worldview, from the influence of the 
classical pragmatists to the development of his postmodern amendments for 
philosophy and what his legacy means for society.  One reason that Rorty is a worthy 
thinker for application is for the character of his tenure in philosophy and fields 
beyond.  His work spanned many of the schools of thought before coming to 
neopragmatism; he had a mastery of seeing multiple sides of an argument while 
remaining optimistic for a notion of fairness (Festenstein, 2001).  Indeed it was his 
ability to carefully pick apart continental and analytic philosophy that led to his 
fusion of thought that seemed to be both in and of philosophy.  He is a uniquely 
American philosopher; after establishing his credentials within the mainstream of the 
discipline, he then picked up where John Dewey’s pragmatism left off, realizing that 
there was more to offer from there.  While American philosophy had been largely 
ignored, Rorty (1979, 1982) melded Quine’s critique of analytics and Kuhn’s insight 
of incommensurability into the alloy to advance a new pragmatism (Hilary Putnam as 
interviewed in McReynolds, 2007). 
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 The history of ideas method will be worked over the broader philosophy as 
well as Rorty’s particular ideas.  Taking a note from Rorty’s notion of progress as a 
series of interesting conversations, the following sections can be considered smaller 
conversations about neopragmatism.  The featured participants include John Dewey, 
Thomas Kuhn, and Jean-Francois Lyotard among Rorty and a sampling of other 
contributors.  The discussion includes topics such as: the community of inquiry; 
postmodernism and the linguistic turn; authoritarianism; and social progress.  The 
concluding explication of neopragmatism will then be prepared for a pairing with the 
metanarrative of public administration and authority that is worked out in Chapter 4. 
 
3.1 Roots in Pragmatism 
As I see the history of pragmatism, there are two great differences between the 
classical pragmatists and the neopragmatists.  The first I have already 
mentioned: it is the difference between talking about ‘experience’, as James 
and Dewey did, and talking about ‘language’, as Quine and Davidson do.  
The second is the difference between assuming that there is something called 
‘the scientific method’, whose employment increases the likelihood of one’s 
beliefs being true, and tacitly abandoning this assumption.  (Rorty, 1999, p. 
35). 
 
Rorty (2007b) credits that pragmatism “abandoned positivism’s attempt to 
elevate science above the rest of culture” and would “substitute the question ‘which 
descriptions of the human situation are most useful for which human purposes?’ for 
the question ‘which description tells us what that situation really is?’” (pp. 916-917).  
Rorty rejected very few of pragmatism’s ideas; however, he added a number of 
qualifiers and tangential streams that explained how to deal with issues in the 
postmodern “neo” perspective that is described farther on in this chapter.  To avoid 
unnecessary tedium, the classical pragmatism of William James, Charles Peirce, and 
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 John Dewey are treated lightly here.  Several exceptional volumes cover this ground 
(Diggins, 1994; McReynolds, 2007; Menand, 1997, 2002; Misak, 2007), while Rorty 
has his own history of the philosophy (1979, 1982), which will serve as the primary 
source to characterize classical pragmatism here as it is merely a reference point for 
the development of neopragmatism. 
Peirce offered “A Definition of Pragmatism” (ca. 1904 in Menand, 1997) to 
set out what he and his fellow “Metaphysical Club” members (Menand, 2002) had 
construed as the new American philosophy: 
The word pragmatism was invented to express a certain maxim of logic… 
intended to furnish a method for the analysis of concepts…The method 
prescribed in the maxim is to trace out in the imagination the conceivable 
practical consequences… (Menand, 1997, p. 56) 
 
A chapter entitled “What Pragmatism Means” in James’s 1907 volume, Pragmatism 
(in Menand, 1997, pp. 93-111) framed pragmatism as “primarily a method of settling 
metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable…to interpret each notion 
by tracing its respective practical consequences” (p. 94).  Rorty (1979) glommed on 
to the philosophy’s distaste for the interminable metaphysical disputes.  The advance 
from classical pragmatism is seen in an early characterization of pragmatism that 
Rorty (1982) provides, beginning with the premise that,  
“Pragmatism” is a vague, ambiguous, and overworked word.  Nevertheless, it 
names the chief glory of our country’s intellectual tradition.  No other 
American writers have offered so radical a suggestion for making our future 
different from our past, as have James and Dewey. (p. 160). 
 
Rorty then gives a three-part description of pragmatism that provides a 
departure point for his own amendments and alterations.  He offers, “My first 
characterization of pragmatism is that it is simply anti-essentialism applied to notions 
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 like “truth,” “knowledge,” “language,” “morality,” and similar objects of 
philosophical theorizing” (1982, p. 162).  He pairs this with the statement that, “There 
is no wholesale, epistemo-logical way to direct, or criticize, or underwrite, the course 
of inquiry” for the pragmatists who prefer, “the vocabulary of practice rather than of 
theory, of action rather than contemplation” (p. 162). 
That position then leads to a salvo against efforts to decisively represent the 
world through language.  Rorty works through the problem of theory trying to capture 
observation, stating that, “When the contemplative mind, isolated from the stimuli of 
the moment, takes large views, its activity is more like deciding what to do than 
deciding that a representation is accurate” (1982, p. 163).  He then continues: 
So a second characterization of pragmatism might go like this: there is no 
epistemological difference between truth about what ought to be and truth 
about what is, nor any metaphysical difference between facts and values, nor 
any methodological difference between morality and science. (p. 163). 
 
The follow-up blow to Platonism is that, “For the pragmatists, the pattern of all 
inquiry – scientific as well as moral – is deliberation concerning the relative 
attractions of various concrete alternatives” (p. 164).  Rorty continues to 
deconstruct the futility of “Platonic, epistemologically-centered philosophy” as 
programmed methodology in pursuit of ahistorical knowledge, as “the search for a 
way in which one can avoid the need for conversation and deliberation and simply 
tick off the way things are” (p. 164). 
 Rorty then looks to those who challenge the Western philosophical 
tradition, calling on James and Dewey as they extended the reach of Nietzsche 
and Heidegger, to separate the idea of truth from any method and deflate the 
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 elitism of those who claim to accurately represent anything more than their own 
contributions to discourse.  
Let me sum up by offering a third and final characterization of pragmatism: it 
is the doctrine that there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational 
ones – no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of objects, or of the 
mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks 
of our fellow inquirers. (p. 165). 
 
Rorty prefers the final wording in that it focuses “on a fundamental choice 
that confronts the reflective mind: that between accepting the contingent character of 
starting-points, and attempting to evade this contingency” (1982, p. 166).  It is clear 
that pragmatism favors the first option; a contingent situation demands conversation 
to determine the course.  Grasping the nature of the conversation is where 
neopragmatism ascends; we must be conscious of the difficulties in using language 
that is beholden to the metanarratives for its meaning and burdened by “wholesale 
constraints”.  Neopragmatism asks for reflection on how the linguistic institutions 
have foundations that may betray attempts to have an open conversation.  The terms 
we use are loaded with signs and indicators that shape the conversation, whether the 
participants are aware of them or not.  For example, consider a game of word-
association that poses “bureaucracy” and incites the response of “waste”.  Thus a term 
that has carried a causal relationship in the past may be used to the benefit (or 
detriment) of the speaker.  These constraints are the problem that Rorty wishes to 
eradicate. 
One of the enduring aspects of classical pragmatism that Rorty calls into play 
is the idea of community.  John Dewey (1927; 1930) popularized the idea of the 
“community of inquiry”, meaning the shared effort at finding practical meaning from 
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 our experiences to guide progress.  His notion included high levels of democratic 
participation for both the creation of ideas and decisions about how to pursue them.  
The community is determined as a group with similar interests and agreement on how 
to work toward their desired outcomes.  George Herbert Mead proposed that, “If men 
are capable of recognizing rights as well as of claiming them, then they are capable of 
forming a community, of establishing institutions whose authority will lie within the 
community itself” (1936, p. 13). 
Rorty was inspired by the work of anti-rationalists – those who refused to 
accept human order as the nature of the world – such as Friedrich Nietzsche and 
Thomas Kuhn.  Yet Rorty (1999) took most of his philosophical material from 
Dewey, recognizing that there was an element of postmodern anti-foundationalism in 
his work: 
The core of Dewey’s thought was an insistence that nothing – not the will of 
God, not the Intrinsic Nature of Reality, not the Moral Law – can take 
precedence over the result of agreement freely reached by members of a 
democratic community.  The pragmatist claim that truth is not correspondence 
to the intrinsic nature of something that exists independently of our choice of 
linguistic descriptions is another expression of this insistence. (pp. 237-238). 
 
Hegel contributed to Rorty’s pursuit of social justice and harmony in a 
methodological sense by emphasizing the historicity of our notions of truth and 
morality, while also confirming that objective certainty was an illusory impediment to 
philosophy, as witnessed by Hegel’s “cheerful commitment to irreducible 
temporality” and “specifically anti-Platonic element in [his] work” (Rorty, 1999, p. 
11).  He took parts from Hegel’s dialectical approach and lessons “about how to 
eschew certainty and eternity” as they informed Dewey’s theme of finding 
consequential solutions that Rorty then integrated into his adaptation of pragmatism, 
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 in the sense that he saw that dualisms could be grappled with (Rorty, 1991, p. 12).  
Meanwhile, Rorty passed over the metaphysical issues that were distracting to such 
an approach, choosing instead to recruit from Nietzsche’s epistemology that was 
oriented toward understanding reality and truth more as matters of solidarity: “The 
best argument we partisans of solidarity have against the realistic partisans of 
objectivity is Nietzsche’s argument that the traditional Western metaphysico-
epistemelogical way of firming up our habits simply isn’t working anymore” (1991, 
p. 33).   
Rorty debated many of the labels assigned to him by critics and admirers 
alike; he was particularly opposed to being called a “relativist”.  He is resolute that 
“the subordination of truth to edification”, that is to say that agreement through 
continued inquiry and discourse for pragmatic practices, does not a relativist make 
(1979, p. 373).  Rorty pointed out that incommensurability between cultures obviates 
the potential for relativism, a particularly sophomoric position that is at odds with his 
fundamental opposition to a knowable objective reality (1991, 1998a).  Rorty made 
special mention of the oft-mistaken view of postmodernism as just a form of 
relativism, affirming that, “there is a difference between saying that every community 
is as good as every other and saying that we have to work out from the networks we 
are, from the communities with which we currently identify” (1991, p. 202).  To this, 
added, “To accuse postmodernism of relativism is to try to put a metanarrative in the 
postmodernist’s mouth” (p. 202).  He noted that, “Philosophers who, like myself, 
eschew this distinction [between the way things are and human cognition of them] 
must abandon the traditional philosophical project of finding something stable which 
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 will serve as a criterion for judging the transitory products of our transitory needs and 
interests” resulting in the need to “give up on the idea that there are unconditional, 
transcultural moral obligations, obligations rooted in an unchanging, ahistorical 
human nature” (1999, p. xvi). 
While Rorty rejected association with relativism, he also identified with 
descriptives such as “anti-essentialism” and “anti-foundationalism”; these terms can 
also be linked to “post-structuralism” in respect to the skepticism of authority that 
they imply.  Approaching from a critique of objectivity (as a general concept), he 
deconstructs the concept because it “should be seen as conformity to the norms of 
justification (for assertions and actions) we find about us” (1979, p. 361).  The 
thought continues as it ties to the metanarrative of authority: 
Such conformity becomes dubious and self-deceptive only when seen as 
some-thing more than this – namely, as a way of obtaining access to 
something which “grounds” current practices of justification in something 
else.  Such a “ground” is thought to need no justification, because it has 
become so clearly and distinctly perceived as to count as a “philosophical 
foundation.” (Rorty, 1979, p. 361). 
 
Rorty was resolute in arguing that we cannot be bound to notions of external 
reality, objectivity, or traditional positivist conceptions of causal relations.  This 
begins to look like relativism except for the rejection of a comparative standard, 
which is the crucial distinction that serves to separate Rorty further from relativism 
than this single qualification suggests.  The addition of his postmodern attitude 
toward language amplifies the difference, while he is careful to avoid confusing the 
issues with undue theories of linguistics that tangle us in a cat’s cradle.  Miller (2004, 
p. 248) defends Rorty’s posture in the wake of the “epistemological rupture of anti-
foundationalism, which came in the wake of Kuhn and Derrida” by noting that 
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 neopragmatism is always ultimately concerned with the “the problems that arise from 
the situation and developing the capacity and competence to deal with them” while 
skirting general theories of representation and misleading notions of correspondence 
to reality (Miller, 2005).   
What the empirical philosophers saw as the achievements of natural science in 
discovering the nature of Reality, the transcendental philosophers saw as 
banausic, as true but irrelevant to Truth. 
Pragmatism cuts across this transcendental/empirical distinction by 
questioning the common presupposition that there is an invidious distinction 
to be drawn between kinds of truths.  For the pragmatist, true sentences are 
not true because they correspond to reality, and so there is no need to worry 
what sort of reality, if any, a given sentence corresponds to – no need to worry 
about what “makes” it true.  (Rorty, 1982, p. xvi). 
 
The quote above illuminates Rorty’s development of neopragmatism in that it 
recognizes the focus on utility as a reasonable place to start any inquiry, in contrast to 
attempts to establish practical usefulness from a higher reality than our actual needs 
and applications.  He went to great pains to move beyond – if not avoid – the enigmas 
of our postmodern epistemological problems by consistently framing the questions in 
terms of practice.  If the argument never got beyond the abstract, there would be no 
progress, as Harmon (2006) explains: 
To pragmatists like Rorty, the question of whether truth does or can exist…is 
inseparable from the question of whether knowledge precedes or, 
alternatively, is produced by action.  Preferring the latter view, Rorty…makes 
his point that the word [truth] could well be dispensed with so that we might 
move on to more edifying subjects. (p. 103). 
 
 
3.2 Postmodernism and the Linguistic Turn 
…the world does not provide us with any criterion of choice between 
alternative metaphors, that we can only compare language or metaphors with 
one another, not with something beyond language called “fact”.  (Rorty, 
1989, p. 20). 
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“The linguistic turn” refers to the postmodern perspective that holds language 
itself as the object of inquiry rather than classical pragmatism’s fixation on 
experience.  This is the condition that follows the movement away from rational 
empiricism as the means to understand our world.  The methods of rational 
empiricism were tied up in explaining what we have experienced.  Rorty (1989) 
concedes how Davidson and other postmodernists built the case against 
representational language, that we “not view language as a medium for either 
expression or representation” (p. 11) and “we treat everything – our language, our 
conscience, our community – as a product of time and chance” (p. 22), but he refused 
to accept the existential nihilism that came from the extension of such arguments.  He 
moved past many language problems by bounding them in their own constructs; any 
philosophical problems resulting from rhetoric can only result in rhetorical solutions 
and, conversely, “The idea that language has a purpose goes once the idea of 
language as medium goes” (1989, p. 16).  For Rorty, non-linguistic context gave 
importance to language that could override its contingent structure in the interest of 
getting on with our lives.   
The first problem of rational empiricism for neopragmatism stems from the 
issue of language as a medium, i.e. the representation of our experiences with words, 
closely followed by the issues involved with fitting our descriptions of experiences 
into the variable positions in the methods of the rational empirical systems.  The 
ability to express an experience in language requires an immediate distillation of that 
experience into the vocabulary at hand, regardless of whether or not that vocabulary 
is adequate to redescribe the experience for further reaction. 
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 Hannah Arendt, in a 1964 interview recorded and entitled “What Remains? 
The Language Remains” (2000) pointed out how language carries a weight of 
meaning through her own experience of changing languages during her career.  Her 
relationship with German is tinged with the memories of the languages use and past 
contingencies; i.e. a German word spoken in a tender context that was once part of a 
barked order from a storm trooper cannot shake the fearful association and is thus 
never neutral in a community that has varied experiences.  Her claim that language 
can be forgotten through psychological repression (p. 13) is an example of 
incoherency between the rational-empirical linguistic aspect of our lives and the 
unsystematic reality of behavior. 
A simple explanation of the problem of language is seen in the practice of 
making meaning of a word through context.  Consider the sensation of an electrical 
shock: by calling it a “shock” we have classified it according to some common notion 
of what a shock is.  We must then (re-)describe the shock in a way that effectively 
conveys our experience, which requires that we attempt to assess similarity or 
dissimilarity of the experience to others’ experiences of shocks, adding modifiers or 
comparative terminology that tries to represent our feelings in another’s mind.  Yet 
the shock of 110 volts on a child feels different than for an electrician because of the 
child’s inexperience and surprise at the sensation, despite there being a standard of 
measurement.  It is the same voltage, measured according to a method of rational 
empiricism by the scientific instruments.  This example highlights the futility in 
putting all our faith in experience and our ability to redescribe it; for the 
neopragmatist, it is much more practical and much less a practice of exclusivity to 
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 operate at the linguistic level, keeping in mind that there is no final vocabulary just as 
there is neither an objective Truth, nor a Platonic reality, nor a common denominator 
for the experience of a 110 volt electric shock. 
Of course, arguments that posit accuracy are dependent on a standard of 
comparison and an objective ideal.  This has been soundly rejected in Rorty's work 
and thus leaves us with the question of the value of any knowledge when there is no 
scale to calibrate truth claims.  Before slipping into relativism, Rorty takes the 
pragmatic angle and holds, “that we understand knowledge when we understand the 
social justification of belief, and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of 
representation” (1979, p. 170).  His pragmatism then resembles a form of 
epistemological behaviorism; what we come to believe through past practice (as 
useful) informs our current practices in a kind of “common sense” (p. 176).  
Orthodoxy, taken as the bureaucratic cop-out of ‘that's how we have always done it’ 
is displaced by challenges from this epistemological behaviorism because it asks, 
“whether authority can attach to assertions by virtue of relations of ‘acquaintance’ 
between persons and, for example, thoughts, impressions, universals, and 
propositions” (p. 177).  The metanarratives that undergird axiomatic practice are then 
susceptible to revision because their orthodoxies are potentially incoherent if they 
continue to be built upon the debatable notion of “fact.”  That incoherency is often a 
byproduct of the prevailing usage of words in new contexts or the revision of word 
usage for practice in prevailing contexts.   
The illumination of this confusion is intentional; it points to the problems of 
language dependency for enduring relevance.  As Miller and Fox (2001) put it, “The 
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 context of daily life contains habit and routine…Daily practices, in turn, generate 
linguistic customs that constitute participants’ meaning making.  So…we argue that 
word usage is not about reality definition so much as sense making within a context” 
(p. 669).  Harmon (2006, p. 102) supports this view by posing, “social phenomena as 
products of language rather than as existing independently of language.  From an 
interpretivist standpoint, organizations are languages no less than are theories.” 
 
3.3 Rorty’s World – The Object of Inquiry 
If there is anything distinctive about pragmatism it is that it substitutes the 
notion of a better human future for the notions of ‘reality’, ‘reason’ and 
‘nature’. (Rorty, 1999, p. 27). 
 
Inquiry is directed at solving problems, not revealing Truths, for 
neopragmatism.  This is lifted, for the most part, from classical pragmatism’s focus of 
inquiry as the means to finding effective outcomes regardless of their accuracy in 
representing reality.  Outcomes – what we want – are the logical conclusions of what 
we have to work with in terms of redescriptions and expressed desires.  As Lyotard 
(1984, pp. 24-25) prescribes, the approach should favor the dialectic over didactic; we 
will host conversations that are an exercise in discovery rather than forcing the 
acceptance of a “truth-value” statement. 
Rorty, when ruminating on the possibility of a social democratic utopia, 
attributed to Dewey the recognition that, “the West is better than any other known 
culture at referring questions of social policy to the results of future experimentation 
rather than to principles and traditions taken over from the past” (1998a, p. 196).  
This appropriation of Dewey is strong evidence of our propensity to find authority 
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 outside metanarratives.  Rorty (1979) goes to great lengths by portraying a secular 
context free from ideas of a teleological order to open a broader horizon for inquiry.  
His characterization of Western societies and hope to “peel apart Enlightenment 
liberalism from Enlightenment rationalism” speaks to his idea that we (the Western 
societies) can “get rid of the notion of universal moral obligations created by 
membership in the species, and substitute the idea of building a community of trust 
between ourselves and others” (2007, p. 55).  Rorty does not propose that the West 
abandon reason and ignore history, but rather that we shape a discourse community 
using “the kind of historical narrative which segues into a utopian scenario about how 
we can get from the present to a better future” (1999, p. 231). His position, like 
Dewey’s attitude toward experimentation, drives a community of experimentation 
that flows from the polity to public administration.   
Heretofore, the community of experimentation has been dominated by 
scientism; the rational-empirical method has been the last word for justification in the 
hard sciences as well as social science inquiry.  Yet we know this is not satisfying 
from a worldview that denies Truth and an ability to represent reality beyond our 
singular experiences. 
Rorty’s view on science is derived from his feelings about truth; it is a method 
of building consensus for localized utility (1991, pp. 35-45).  He acknowledges that 
there is the possibility for a system-specific type of accurate prediction through 
scientific method and it is useful for our existence in some circumstances (i.e. those 
circumstances described by that system), but it is still not a window to (or mirror of) 
an objective reality, nor can it provide universal principles.  He criticizes natural 
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 science’s claims to reaching objective grounds as the, “concrete absurdity of thinking 
that the vocabulary used by present science, morality, or whatever has some 
privileged attachment to reality which makes it more than just a further set of 
descriptions” (1979, p. 361) and denies that science is a more realistic account of the 
world “in virtue of the fact that (at the moment) there is more consensus in the 
sciences than in the arts” (p. 362).  He takes on science’s purported elite rationality by 
dividing it into “method” and “reason”, crediting science with the former and 
attributes the latter to moral civilization (1991, p. 37).  
Rorty then goes on to use Kuhn’s (1996, p. 171) question that dissolves 
science’s effort: “Does it really help to imagine that there is some one full, objective, 
true account of nature and that the proper measure of scientific achievement is the 
extent to which it brings us closer to that ultimate goal?”  Science is a human 
construct that must always keep its origins in sight, rather than harboring false notions 
of being a method with exclusive claims to truth empowered by the ability to 
transcend the eventual limitations of human fallibility.  Recalling his affinity for the 
epiphany of paradigm shifts, Rorty states, “Kuhn was one of the best things that ever 
happened to pragmatism, for his work helped us accept Dewey’s suggestion that 
reasoning in morals is no different from reasoning in science” (2007b, p. 922).  The 
potential contributions of the social sciences are considered similarly: “It is a mistake 
to think that when we know how to deal justly and honorably with a person or a 
society we thereby know how to predict and control him or her or it, and a mistake to 
think that ability to predict and control is necessarily an aid to such dealing” (Rorty, 
1982, p. 198, italics in original).  From his perspective, Rorty says that “the desire for 
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 objectivity is not the desire to escape the limitations of one’s community, but simply 
the desire for as much inter-subjective agreement as possible” (1991, p. 23), 
foreshadowing the idea of consensus under solidarity, as the next section will explain.   
The truthfulness that science can provide is actually a measure of consensus, 
derived through repeated practice and acceptance.  Science and scientific 
methodology “is a model of human solidarity” (Rorty, 1991, p. 39); any greater 
attribution is beyond reason.  Rorty does praise some of the institutions of science, 
however, and suggests that there are useful models for the rest of culture from these 
institutions that can “give concreteness and detail to the idea of ‘unforced 
agreement’.”  Science can be a way to enable “free and open encounters” because we 
all have equal access to its methods and that can serve to facilitate the position that, 
“the best way to find out what to believe is to listen to as many suggestions and 
arguments as you can” (p. 39).   
If one considers the qualifying accuracy that accompanies any scientific claim 
– i.e. the probability of the causal relationship being explained by the operations in an 
experiment – then it is akin to a poll of belief.  Again, Rorty makes no claim that 
science can reflect 95% of the truth or that the scientific efforts have anything at all to 
do with objective reality.  Scientific endeavors can firm up our beliefs as 
“consensus”, label such beliefs as “knowledge”, and then establish “solidarity” for 
future progress.  Rorty illuminates the transition point of that progression: “Insofar as 
pragmatists make a distinction between knowledge and opinion, it is simply the 
distinction between topics on which such agreement is relatively easy to get and 
topics on which agreement is relatively hard to get” (1991, p. 23).  It is important to 
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 emphasize that Rorty does not criticize science for its methods, which he sees as a 
means to unforced agreement in the proper context and an institution that “gives 
concreteness and detail to the idea of ‘unforced agreement’” (1991, p. 39), but he 
does object to claims that science is the ultimate embodiment of reason and a key to 
knowledge of Truths.  The potential for science to uphold such exclusivity is 
objectionable when it is considered “a model of human solidarity” (1991, p. 39).   
Neopragmatism deflates the value of science because the goal of scientific 
inquiry has been postured as an ability to reveal something (Truth) that is beyond its 
capabilities and has led to untenable claims with sometimes disastrous outcomes.  
Whether the shakiness of science is due to conflicts in values behind the methods or 
unknown effects that erupt after acting on limited tests, science is not the final 
vocabulary for many lines of inquiry, especially in the realm of public problems.  
Rorty expresses the trouble in the following: “But though objectivity is a useful goal 
when one is trying to calculate means to ends by predicting the consequences of 
action, it is of little relevance when one is trying to decide what sort of person or 
nation to be” (1998b, p. 11). 
Rorty discredited epistemology as a philosophical pursuit, as it often 
deteriorated into arguments over one language scheme's ability to accurately represent 
knowledge as being superior to another.  He prescribed getting rid of the ‘copy 
theory’ of knowledge” in favor of Pierce’s position that “the ability to use signs is 
essential to thought” – a notion that ushered in the linguistic turn (2006, p. 259).  
Early in his campaign for the preeminence of democratic consensus over the old 
guards of knowledge, Rorty stated that, “To construct an epistemology is to find the 
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 maximum amount of common ground with others” (1979, p. 316).  This leads to the 
need for consideration of contingency, as the “others” with whom we find consensus 
at any moment in time always changes as human populations ebb, flow, and evolve.  
More broadly, epistemology is a language scheme and language is localized in time 
and place. 
 
3.4 Progress through Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 
There is a growing willingness to neglect the question ‘What is our nature?’ and 
to substitute the question ‘What can we make of ourselves?’ (Rorty, 1998a, p. 
169).   
 
When Gadamer (1976) said “It is true of every conversation that through it 
something different has come to be” (p. xxii), he provided the seed of Rorty’s notion 
of progress as making life more interesting.  For Rorty, progress “substitutes the 
notion of a better human future for the notions of ‘reality’, ‘reason’, and ‘nature’.  
One may say of pragmatism what Novalis said of Romanticism, that it is ‘the 
apotheosis of the future’.” (1999, p. 27).  Progress is an especially crucial component 
of neopragmatism; it is the ultimate justification that is shared by every community 
however they each may define it. 
Rorty proposes several important concepts that serve as the stepping stones to 
employing neopragmatism for progress.  He establishes that we do not need to have 
“foundations of knowledge” that set “truths which are certain because of their causes 
rather than because of the arguments given for them” (1979, p. 157). He agrees that 
there is a pragmatic use of “necessary truth” only so far as we take it to mean,  
The idea of a proposition which is believed because the ‘grip’ of the object 
upon us is ineluctable.  Such a truth is necessary in the sense in which it is 
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 sometimes necessary to believe that what is before our eyes looks red – there 
is a power, not ourselves, which compels us.  (pp. 157-8). 
 
Rorty then embellishes how we might proceed without accounts of practice 
that are justified by authoritative traditions.  He disputes that philosophy has anything 
to offer liberal society and deflates the metanarrative that philosophy is the arbiter of 
truth claims: 
 Edifying philosophy is not only abnormal but reactive, having sense only as a 
protest against attempts to close off conversation by proposals for universal 
com-mensuration through the hypostatization of some privileged set of 
descriptions.  The danger which edifying discourse tries to avert is that some 
given vocabulary, some way in which people might come to think of 
themselves, will deceive them into thinking that from now on all discourse 
could be, or should be, normal discourse. (1979, p. 377). 
 
Before revisiting the possibility that he is just a relativist, the Kuhnian 
perspective comes back into play to show how the desire for progress shapes activity 
in meaningful, interesting ways.  Remaining faithful to Rorty’s idea that progress is 
not assessed by whether we have approached Truth or accurately represented Reality 
means that we eschew the objective of neutral descriptions and justificatory standard 
languages (i.e.  positivist science) in favor of the conception of progress as continual 
conversation that “will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing them to 
look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic behavior, for example, the adoption 
of new scientific equipment or new social institutions” (Rorty, 1989, p. 9). 
 Contingency has been discussed already to some extent; it is closely related to 
the consideration of context.  Contingency refers to the conditions that affect the 
discursive side to our progress, while context – with all due respect to the problems of 
dichotomous arrangements – refers to the applied side of progress.  Contingency is 
manifest in language, on which Rorty (1989) elaborates to hammer home the point 
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 that there is no “final vocabulary” that we should pursue because there is no final 
situation.  In other words, if the idea that Reality is out there and we merely need to 
figure out how to represent it, then there are no such things as real contingencies (if a 
contingency is thought of as some anomaly from the normal situation), only 
shortcomings in our ability to describe all the aspects of the Reality.  Yet we know 
that, practically, there will always be some context with contingencies that cannot be 
handled by our limited language and capacity for representation; either the literal 
words or methods available to describe a system will not provide a coherent notion of 
progress in that situation.  Yet all is not lost, as Hoch (2006) assures in his application 
of Rorty to public administration and planning: 
Recognizing contingency does not mean accepting or yielding to arbitrary or 
unfair circumstances.  We may not know beyond a shadow of a doubt what 
the future holds, but this does not mean we cannot know what it means to 
successfully resist or reform destructive conditions.  (p. 397). 
 
As the world is a dynamic place and things are constantly changing – thus 
presenting contingencies to the normal situation that current language can 
satisfactorily represent – we must have the awareness of that dynamism and 
continually adapt our vocabulary to keep pace.  Rorty argues that, “the vocabulary of 
Enlightenment rationalism, although it was essential to the beginnings of liberal 
democracy, has become an impediment to the preservation and progress of 
democratic societies” (1989, p. 44) because the old vocabulary was made to set the 
world in a fixed place where things did not change and therefore there was no such 
thing as a contingency.  To complicate it a bit further, Rorty adds that contingency 
can reflect the internal commitment of humans (p. 61) insofar as the community has 
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 to deal with the contingency of its members’ behavior and adherence to the language 
that is shared for redescription. 
 From contingency we move to irony, perhaps less obvious but nonetheless 
pivotal to the connection between neopragmatism and liberal democracy.  Rorty calls 
the “ironist” somebody “who faces up to the contingency of his or her most central 
beliefs and desires” (1989, p. xv) and outlines how those liberals who avoids 
adherence to notions of the “final vocabulary” come to realize: 
That anything can be made to look good or bad by being redescribed, and 
their renunciation of the attempt to formulate criteria between final 
vocabularies puts them in a position which Sartre called ‘meta-stable’: never 
quite able to take themselves seriously because they are always aware that the 
terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware 
of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their 
selves. (1989, pp. 73-4). 
 
 The liberal ironist who heeds the contingencies of language is then left to 
grapple with what progress can conceivably be.  At first blush, “Liberal ironists are 
people who include among these ungroundable desires their own hope that suffering 
will be diminished, that the humiliation of human beings by other human beings may 
cease” (1989, p. xv).  Rorty does not leave the liberal ironist on her own, however, as 
the redescriptions and management of contingencies are treated in the community.  
The community can be those who share a fence line between properties, those who 
share a common dialect, a nation, or even the planet.  Rorty wishes to continually 
expand the community – “coming to see other human beings as ‘one of us’ rather 
than as ‘them’” (1989, p. xvi) – because, as Chapter 4 will detail, the ability to recog-
nize others as more similar than dissimilar can lead to peaceful agreement on the 
terms that we use to discuss progress and (hopefully) the actions we take from there.   
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 The similarity between people is the basis of solidarity, which Rorty equates 
with the recognition of community.  Although he urges that, “we try not to want 
something that stands beyond history and institutions” (1989, p. 189), he does want us 
to feel some moral obligation to extend the boundaries of those with whom we can 
identify: “feelings of solidarity are necessarily a matter of which similarities and 
dissimilarities strike us as salient, and that such salience is a function of a historically 
contingent final vocabulary” (p. 192).  He would like people to have, 
the ability to see more and more traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, 
customs, and the like) as unimportant when compared with similarities with 
respect to pain and humiliation – the ability to think of people wildly different 
from ourselves as included in the range of “us.” (p. 192). 
  
From that point we can work toward consensus (agreement about a decision) 
in a democratic manner.  Solidarity can be seen as the citizen who understands her 
role as a democratic participant in the polity, the same role that her neighbor plays, 
despite any deep-rooted differences in opinion that they may hold.  Rorty wants to 
“distinguish human solidarity as the identification with ‘humanity as such’ and as the 
self-doubt which has gradually, over the last few centuries, been inculcated into 
inhabitants of the democratic states” (1989, p. 198).  If consensus refers to the 
conviction, then solidarity is regarded as the right to hold such conviction, a right that 
we all share.  The modus vivendi commonly attributed to Voltaire illustrates the 
interplay of consensus and solidarity: “I may not agree with what you say, but I will 
defend to the death your right to say it.” 
Progress is important to Rorty, but it is different from Dewey’s idea of 
progress at a fundamental level.  While as Dewey and common traditions portray 
progress as change toward an objective, such as equity or justice, Rorty turns the 
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 notion around to avoid Truths as grand objectives and instead views progress as 
change from a state that is dissatisfactory.  This inversion is actually more truthful in 
the sense that we have the experience of the past conditions and can make logically 
valid justification about responding to those conditions.  Progress toward is very 
uncertain and can lead to a worsening of conditions.  We may argue that Rorty’s 
version is the more hopeful type of progress only if it is qualified as an effort to 
alleviate a situation that has been determined by democratic consensus to be 
unsatisfactory, such as inequity or injustice: “progress is indeed in the direction of 
greater human solidarity…as the ability to see more and more traditional differences 
as unimportant” (1989, p. 192).  Yet it is also associated with rational-empiricism and 
the reactionary behavior of conservativism because any notions of progress require 
reflection on where we are and have been as the catalyst of change for something 
else.  This apparent conflict in ideology does not interest Rorty, as postmodern 
contortions explain that the labels are insufficient, if not meaningless when applied to 
notions of progress that may fall beyond the restrictions of the final vocabularies in 
which they reside.  Progress must be expressed in terms of past experience but it is 
not likewise restricted to the past vocabulary.  Rorty does not abide an eschatological 
perspective, preferring that we consider historians, “as people who help us understand 
how we tricked ourselves in the past rather than as people who tell us the right thing 
to do in the future” (1998a, p. 242). 
 We can now approach a major piece of Rorty’s philosophy of liberalism, in 
juxtaposition to the aforementioned conservatism as adherence to bounded traditions 
in a metanarrative.  For Rorty, liberalism is directly related to justice, which is 
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 arguably his first and only foundation (1989, 1991, 1998, 2007).  The defining 
characteristic of the liberal is one who view cruelty as the worst thing that we can do 
(1989, pp. 73-95) and more specifically, that rational behavior by liberals in society is 
“to suggest that somewhere among their shared beliefs and desires there may be 
enough resources to permit agreement on how to coexist without violence” (2007, p. 
53).  Rorty describes,  
A liberal society is one whose ideals can be fulfilled by persuasion rather than 
force, by reform rather than revolution, by the free and open encounters of 
present linguistic and other practices with suggestions for new practices… [It] 
has no purpose except freedom, no goal except a willingness to see how such 
encounters go and to abide by the outcome (1989, p. 60).   
 
Rorty links the rejection of the correspondence account of truth with the 
utopian notion of liberalism that classical pragmatism developed from Mills’ On 
Liberty: “nothing remains sacred save the freedom to lead your life by your own 
lights” and that the “romantic utilitarians [as he calls James and Dewey] certainly 
want to disenchant the past” (1999. p. 271).  The idea is developed further: 
For any non-utilitarian definition of ‘right’ and any non pragmatist definition 
of ‘true’ will lend aid and comfort to the idea that there is an authority – for 
example, the eternal moral law, or the intrinsic structure of reality – which 
takes precedence over agreement between free human beings about what to do 
or what to believe. (1999, pp. 271-2). 
 
When fully assembled, Rorty’s idea of progress is a sort of hierarchy of 
the neopragmatist concepts.  Whereas contingency, irony, and solidarity refer to 
characteristics of society, consensus and community are the products of the 
characteristics’ interplay in the context of liberalism.  When these concepts are 
realized – which in Rorty’s parlance would mean they are part of the democratic 
conversation – societies can make social progress.  The authority that enables the 
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 linkages between these concepts is found in the utility function that guides 
progress.  That is to say that the pursuit of justice and less cruelty holds the 
warrant of authority to assemble the contingency, irony, and solidarity for 
consensus in the liberal community.  The good-Samaritan is only hindered by 
those who benefit from injustice; the authority to stop cruelty is a de facto 
property of Rorty’s liberal citizen and flows throughout the hierarchy of social 
progress. 
Justice is the perennially unrealized end-state of liberal society – in contrast to 
the Rawlsian approach that puts it first – that we have yet to achieve but hold as the 
to-be-determined (by consensus) contrast to things that we currently determine (by 
consensus) as unjust.  Justice requires determination based on contingencies, but 
following the scheme described above, we are aware of the tenuous nature of the 
redescriptions of the contingencies that inform our justification of an assessment of 
something as unjust.  Furthermore, we can be aware of the justification and of the 
assessment as themselves being redescriptions in a context.  We have now become 
“liberal ironists” (Rorty, 1989, p. 60) by virtue of our doubt about the efficacy of the 
vocabularies used for the redescriptions, the ambiguity of their tenacity, and the 
probability that there are other redescriptions that may move us away from injustice 
in a different way. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESHAPING AUTHORITY FOR NEOPRAGMATIST GOVERNANCE 
Cultural relativism is associated with irrationalism because it denies the 
existence of morally relevant transcultural facts…But one need not be 
irrationalist in the sense of ceasing to make one’s web of belief as coherent, 
and as perspicuously structured, as possible.  Philosophers like myself, who 
think of rationality as simply the attempt at such coherence, agree… that 
Foundationalist projects are outmoded. (Rorty, 1998a, p. 171). 
 
This chapter develops the more abstract theoretical alternative understanding 
of authority in a democracy.  As the Statement of Problem (Chapter 1.1) puts it, the 
contemporary American society has been challenged to uphold the metanarrative of 
administrative authority as described by the traditions of administrative expertise, 
representation, and practice.  That metanarrative has relied on rationality to such a 
degree that the coherence its traditions promise has been overextended, as Rorty 
highlights in the above quote.  He does not propose to do away with reason or 
attempts to verify causality, but neopragmatism does ask that we not force experience 
into molds that have been cast from foundations.  When it comes to governance, this 
entails a rethinking of the relationship between the polity and public administration, a 
relationship that involves authority at every juncture but does not require the same old 
rationality to forge an effective alloy.  
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 The task now is to bring together the metanarrative of public administration 
described in Chapter 2 with the ideas of neopragmatism presented in Chapter 3 to 
illuminate where the former has issues that the latter may address.  The idea of 
“neopragmatizing” is offered as the mechanism, as Miller (2004, 2005) prescribed, to 
“upgrade” public administration.  This entails a thorough and constant awareness of 
“the linguistic turn” that then begs the need for the epistemic community, which is the 
core theme of Chapter 5.   
The offerings of neopragmatism for governance have been sparsely treated in 
the literature, although contemporary works from Fox & Miller (2001, 2007), 
Hildebrand (2005, 2008), and Stivers (2008a, 2008b) have discussed the potentialities 
for public administration.  The notion of reviving classical pragmatism for 
governance has had more popularity in recent years (Alford & Hughes, 2008; Box, 
2001; Shields, 2004, 2008; Snider, 2000b); however, when placed against the 
compelling doubts posed by postmodernism, the limitations of the earlier philosophy 
are hereby bypassed by using a neopragmatist approach to public administration. 
 
4.1 Process: The Neopragmatist’s Hammer 
For as long as we think there is an ahistorical power that makes for 
righteousness – a power called truth or rationality – we will not be able to put 
foundationalism behind us. (Rorty, 1998a, p. 176). 
 
When Lyotard (1984) contemplated technological advancements in society 
and said, “The nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged within this context of 
general transformation” (p. 4), he awoke a need to expand the development of 
practices to incorporate the contemporary into the timeline of learning.  That is to say 
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 that, as we consider what we do with an eye to the successful or useful actions, our 
current and future activity demands that we not only look around us for information 
that will affect how we continue to address issues, but that we think about whether 
our thinking itself is up to date.  Although postmodernism can throw us headlong into 
black holes of revision that challenge the legitimacy of the smallest step toward an 
idea of progress, a more optimistic outlook suggests that the problems we face may 
not be so much as problems with the systems of processes we have at hand as they are 
problems in even referring to the systems for contexts and contingencies that we have 
never faced before.  It is too easy to say that new circumstances require new ways of 
thinking without factoring in the qualities of human nature that are formed by our 
desires for security and predictability.   
Humans tend be empirical when looking for answers because we do not want 
to feel adrift.  The past is our intrinsic default authority; public administration is built 
on the past because it is a comfortable and fixed system that is easily justifiable and 
does not need continual explaining.  Those who work from an empirically legitimated 
vantage are the agents of this authority, recalling the very things that made us feel 
secure and promise success based on past success (or lessons learned from failure).  
This is not a set-up to suggest that living the empirical life and submitting to such 
authority is a naïve or conservative way to go about the world, but it is fairly clear to 
see that with a dabbling of postmodernism even the best practices and most reliable 
authority have to be reconsidered in the inevitably dynamic contexts of life.  We 
demand the types of progress that are life altering (improving the conditions of 
cruelty that we wish to move away from), yet we overlook the need to upgrade the 
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 foundations that even lead to the ideas that come from the march of progress.  It is at 
this juncture between empiricism and postmodernism that we find problems of 
authority.   
Whereas Lyotard (1984) deflates the nature of knowledge and the authority 
that relies on epistemology, neopragmatism allows for some of the security and 
predictability to carry forward with the caution that discourse needs to be aware of the 
world of abstractions in which we operate.  An authority of empirical epistemology, 
as found in the public administration metanarrative discussed in Chapter 2, is an ideal 
subject for neopragmatizing, herein proposed as a process for progress.  As the 
research problem was presented, the metanarratives need to be “deflated”.  For 
neopragmatism, this means distancing any truth claims from metaphysical notions 
and instead linking such claims to our experiences and thus making clear that truth 
claims are not independent of the individual’s perceptions.  Rorty takes exception to 
the legitimacy of vocabularies as having metaphysical transcendence; truth claims 
within such vocabularies should be eradicated because, “the intellectual tradition to 
which they belong has not paid off, is more trouble than it is worth, has become an 
incubus” (1982, p. xxxvii).  Even a consensus for the truth of a claim does not remove 
it from inquiry, for in Rorty’s view democratically achieved consensus does not 
elevate a claim to a big “T” truth.  More important to him than majority rule is the 
justice afforded by solidarity in the democratic process itself, placing consensus as a 
dynamic characteristic of those things we do in a democratically-minded solidarity.  
That solidarity of democracy is the trump of metanarratives that fall below it in 
ontological terms; the utility of a particular consensus is always dependent on its 
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 agreement with the greater good of social progress (which is always “more 
democracy”). 
If we look at progress as the drive toward better life, then neopragmatism 
offers a process that incorporates the utility of actions predicated on empiricism with 
a reflective stance toward the contingency of conditions that face us and consideration 
of how we even think about utility, action, context, and inquiry itself.  If the extreme 
image of a public administrator waxing postmodern at a city council meeting is 
unrealistic, then the idea that we should dutifully adhere to authority rooted in a static 
metanarrative should be equally preposterous.  Using Miller’s (2004) paraphrasing of 
Rorty’s cheerful outlook, neopragmatists concentrate on “what is useful rather than 
what is true” and “are not pining for a blissful utopia; they just want tomorrow to be a 
great day, and they do not want to spend all their time fashioning elaborate ethical 
blueprints for how tomorrow should conduct itself” (p. 247). 
The most effective swipe at the metanarratives that offend neopragmatism is 
to portray them as self-contained, self-referential, and self-supporting schemes of 
language.  Using the supreme paradox of first philosophies – that we cannot think 
about the world without language – then it follows that a conversation about the 
world is using the set of words that are available by the language scheme.  Thus the 
world is constantly being described, categorized, and otherwise reframed from our 
perception of it to the re-described, re-categorized, and re-reframed expression of it 
from our minds to the language that we know.  Suffice it to say that some people have 
more interesting language abilities than others as proven by their ability to garner 
support and consensus about a particular re-description, re-categorization, or re-
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 reframing of their observations and conjectures.  We can easily see how this leads to 
claims of expertise and authority; the most appealing orator is central to such a 
society’s progress. 
Given the development of Rorty’s ideas into the process of neopragmatizing, 
the thrust of this effort must now turn to applying the process for public 
administration and authority.  The connection between the philosophical concept and 
the discipline at issue – what makes it an appropriate theoretical endeavor – is that 
Rorty had strong views on social justice and democracy that neatly overlie the themes 
of good governance as we see in public administration literature and practice.  By 
clearly defining social justice and democracy from his work, they can be presented 
with the ideas of contemporary public administration theorists to show a level of 
commensurability.  This is the invitation to the public administration discourse for 
Rorty’s ideas that then leads to the contributions forthwith.  The conversation on 
administrative authority is open for the idea of neopragmatizing. 
 Consensus is the justification of authority in democratic practice.  It is, 
“closely tied to reason-giving in both origin and outcome.  Like any social practice, 
reason-giving proceeds from an intersubjective acceptance of a set of norms, and it 
tends toward agreement on claims that have been justified by practice” (Gutting, in 
Guignon and Hiley, 2003, p. 49).  Note that this definition of consensus is predicated 
on an “intersubjective acceptance of a set of norms” – a fairly good facsimile of the 
operational definition of solidarity, which was previously presented as the antecedent 
to reaching consensus in a community.  Consensus is a process of developing 
objectives for progress through democratic discourse without abusing authority, 
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 assuming the consensus reached is not an asymmetrical policy that favors one faction 
at the expense of other factions.  Consensus is a part of authority; it is the catalyst to 
its development (i.e. we need to do something and some agency needs justification 
for the legitimate power to implement the resultant policy), it is the reaffirmation of 
its scope, and it is the assignation of responsibility that makes it a necessary part of 
governance. 
Consideration of context is primary concern for neopragmatizing.  As 
presented earlier, American public administration is a product of the liberal 
constitutional state.  This setting requires examination through the neopragmatist’s 
lens before applying the process to governance and the traditions of the administrative 
authority metanarrative.  Rorty (1989) sets the scene by describing the polity of the 
neopragmatized liberal constitutional state:  
The citizens of my liberal utopia would be people who had a sense of the 
contingency of their language and moral deliberation, and thus of their 
consciences, and thus of their community.  They would be liberal ironists – 
people who…combined commitment with a sense of the contingency of their 
own commitment.  (p. 61). 
 
He also offers the broader idea of a neopragmatist national perspective: 
The advantage of postmodernist liberalism is that it recognizes that in 
recommending that ideal one is not recommending a philosophical outlook, a 
conception of human nature or the meaning of human life, to representatives 
of other cultures.  All we should do is point out the practical advantages of 
liberal institutions in allowing individuals and cultures to get along together 
without intruding on each other’s privacy, without meddling with each other’s 
conceptions of the good.  (Rorty, 1991, p. 209). 
 
There is much to be appreciated here for neopragmatism.  “New pragmatism can 
serve the hands-off ‘negative liberty’ function that old pragmatism does not serve,” 
states Miller (2004), “New pragmatism sees liberty not as an abstract political belief 
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 but as a practice that enables the discourse to be democratic.  The practice of liberty is 
nothing less than competence in the art of governance” (p. 247).   
Rorty provides a neat trick to reconcile the American brand of individualistic 
liberalism with the precepts we need for a just society.  In the essay, “Justice as a 
Larger Loyalty” (2007, pp. 42-55), he illustrates through hypothetical scenarios how 
dividing lines between members of a community are eventually shown to be arbitrary 
and we must therefore extend our conceptions of equity and justice to all.  This 
Rawlsian perspective is played out through economic, political, and social vectors to 
illustrate the point that justice has a quality of relevance.   
For example, our sense of fairness in terms of a minimum wage is certainly 
extended to all our fellow citizens – nobody should toil for less than a certain hourly 
rate in our country.  Yet we have little objection to a third world laborer earning far 
less than the American worker for the same output if it benefits our immediate 
community and does not strike us as unfair to the extent of our knowledge of the 
third-world labor market.  This notion of regional or community justice can be 
applied across infinite issues of society, reinforcing the idea that particular 
contingencies demand unique approaches (i.e. the higher cost of living in the US 
requires a greater earnings and cheaper products from overseas labor).  On a more 
familiar plane, we understand and accept that renting an apartment in New York City 
carries a different set of contingencies than renting an apartment in Cleveland, yet the 
exorbitant cost of the former does not make it unjust to a migrant from the latter. 
Rorty moves the argument to the broader problems of reason and authority, 
begging the question as to whether those ideas have to be considered in terms of their 
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 relevance for a particular situation or community.  The answer is highly qualified: 
reason is not universal and therefore authority that is grounded in a reasoned process 
is similarly provincial to a degree.  That is to say that upon encountering someone 
who does not share our view, we should hesitate to label them as irrational or 
antiauthoritarian and instead entertain the possibility that “she does not seem to share 
enough relevant beliefs and desires with us to make possible fruitful conversation 
about the issue in dispute” (Rorty, 2007, p. 54).   This does not mean that we need to 
dispense with all notions of reason and authority, yet it does suggest the need for 
recognizing that a sphere of influence is bounded by a context that is determined by 
those who share recognition of the influence.  In other words, the social contract is 
functional only to the extent that members of the society explicitly understand and 
agree to it. 
The relation of Rorty’s argument to constitutional liberalism is found in the 
American community.  Our national community is situated in the context of 
constitutional liberalism, yet there are regional, local, and even individual 
conceptions of what this means.  Constitutional liberalism in Idaho is different for all 
intents and purposes than constitutional liberalism in Massachusetts.  Likewise, the 
authority for governance that a citizen recognizes in California differs from that of a 
Texan; consider the issue of medical marijuana between the two states (legal in the 
former, far from acceptable in the latter).  The disconnect between individuals who 
reject an instance of authority is often seen as irrational behavior – the Oklahoma City 
bombing serves as an example – because the citizens who perpetrated this horrid act 
did not share enough relevant beliefs and desires to discuss their problems with the 
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 greater community.  The point is that the American context is highly subjective and 
this erodes the sphere of influence for authority as the particular issues of governance 
become more focused to a smaller community, just as Rorty showed that justice for a 
family member who works for minimum wage in a factory is different than justice for 
the Chinese worker (2007, p. 43).  Thus, even the basic neopragmatist desire for less 
cruelty in the world means different policy implications for different states, despite 
the states starting from some level of commonly shared ideals (being part of the 
United States). 
Richard Posner provides a poignant entry for neopragmatism (although he 
does not add the “upgrade” in terminology from classical pragmatism to 
neopragmatism) when promoting the idea of the “living constitution” (2003).  This 
approach is a form of neopragmatizing insofar that Posner considers context in the 
interpretation of the Constitutional text and utilization of precedents.  Text is not 
objective Truth, but rather a representation of principles that then require 
interpretation for the circumstances of the case.  As he builds his case for pragmatism 
in judicial practice, Posner adds thoughts that echo Rorty’s idea about pragmatic 
authority being rooted in the problem at hand:  
[Pragmatism] may encourage the thought that judges should reconceive their 
mission as that of helping society to cope with its problems, and therefore that 
the rules that judges create as a byproduct of adjudication should be appraised 
by a “what works” criterion rather than by their correspondence to truth, 
natural law, or some other abstract validating principle.  (Posner, 2003, p. 47). 
 
Blanket application of the static text or the forced alignment of precedents becomes 
an exercise in interpretation, rather than a process of understanding and eventual 
consensus about the desired outcomes of judicial practices.  Precedent holds a place 
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 like the empirical record and evaluation of past practice, but when positioned between 
the fixed text and the current situation – which however similar to the precedent’s 
circumstances, it is nonetheless always different if for no other reason than the fact 
that we are aware of the existence of the precedent and the possibility of its 
application is tainting our assessment of its applicability – a precedent’s value in the 
method of inquiry and to the desired outcome must be tempered with the due 
consideration of the enlightened experience of our contemporary being.  Posner states 
that, “Precedents that are squarely on the point do have authority in a court of law, but 
their authority is political – that is, ultimately rooted in force – rather than epistemic 
in character” (1990, p. 420).  In other words, we may take some guidance from a 
precedent for neopragmatic governance but it must be suspect as an artifact of the 
public administration metanarrative.  In a neopragmatist perspective, Posner indicates 
that authority exercised as experiential knowledge from analogous contexts is not 
shared or neopragmatically consensual authority from a position of epistemic 
solidarity. 
 
4.2 Neopragmatizing Authority 
And it is an error of the authoritarian trend in political thought to believe that 
authority can survive the decline of institutional religion and the break in the 
continuity of tradition. (Arendt, 2005, p. 51). 
 
Raadschelders and Stillman (2007) define “old” authority as: “the accepted or 
legitimate use of power, formally invested in an individual officeholder…the use of 
which is constrained by explicit rules” (p. 12).  They constructed this definition to 
allow further study of authority for public administration and it serves as solid and 
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 reliable for traditional administrative practice, yet the neopragmatist perspective takes 
issue with some of its implicit elements.  The operational definition requires an 
upgrade for more current use; it is coherent only within the traditional system from 
which it emerged.  Indeed, the authors provide a revision that hints at what 
neopragmatists would like to see, defining administrative authority as: 
The property (not possession) or characteristic of a civil servant to make 
binding decisions and take legitimate action, within a specified institutional 
arrangement, either upon explicit expression of or implicit delegation by the 
legislature or political executive or upon autonomous understanding of the 
common interest, provided that such action (i.e., making binding decisions) is 
taken on the basis of constant interaction with other stakeholders 
(representatives of interest groups, citizens). (Raadschelders & Stillman, 2007, 
p. 14). 
 
 Armed with this well-qualified understanding of authority, the process of 
neopragmatizing will impute a sense of perpetual uncertainty to authority.  The force 
of its doubt is realized in the manifestation of incoherencies that erode authority; 
those moments when those who take the action or make decisions by virtue of their 
knowledge find that the warrants are groundless in light of the current contingencies 
on their practice.  Rorty deconstructs warrants in a debate with another philosopher 
over relativism (1998a, pp. 43-62), viewing the idea of a justification or warrant “as a 
sociological matter” (p. 50).  He emphasizes that so much of warranted assertibility – 
that which is proclaimed by virtue of authority – is dependent on norms and standards 
that are historical products.  Furthermore, the norms and standards are historical 
products that are mutable; they evolve and can be reformed, thus making warrants 
into dynamic reasons.  The dynamism may be determined by majority rule, although 
Rorty is quick to note that Nazi fascism ran on this principle (p. 51), or just simple 
 89
 ethnocentrism (p. 167), which Rorty repeatedly accepts as a reasonable enough 
approach to figuring out what works.   
 At various points in Rorty’s work there is a definite anti-authoritarian slant, 
including outright statements that pragmatism is at odds with claims of authority 
(2006, pp. 257-266).  Rorty builds this position by enumerating the problems of 
representation that he has already rebuked in numerous ways (1979) and offering 
instead a kind of instrumental epistemology (in contradistinction to traditional 
philosophical epistemology that constructs schemes of facts and truths) to get around 
the authoritarianism that representation fosters.  He wished to avoid making appeals 
to authority (1982); for Rorty, “An appeal to truth and rationality is just as dangerous 
as an appeal to a God or a dictator” (Misak, 2008, p. 100).  Although a strong 
commitment to a viewpoint is fair game, Bacon (2006) reads Rorty’s (2006) anti-
authoritarianism as holding that an argument “cannot claim an authority for those 
views beyond that which can be gained for them in conversation” (Bacon, 2006, p. 
865). 
Instead of “humbling ourselves” before representations that are imposed in the 
authoritative texts (such as the Constitution, the Koran, or The Republic) that guide 
our actions (Rorty, 2006, p. 257), there is the alternative of challenging the 
interpretation by combining, “a refusal of the text’s political authority over us with a 
denial that interpretations can have any epistemic authority” (Cohn, 2006, p. 25).  
Thus texts, which are merely representations with the oft perceived additional sense 
of authority because they are fixed on the page, must be regarded as having neither 
intrinsic meaning nor authority.  Cohn goes on to apply Rorty’s position to the 
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 misappropriation of authority through representation (in texts, specifically, as they are 
used to produce meanings) as particularly insidious to democratic society: “It is 
because there is no real meaning to be represented that the text cannot claim any 
legitimate authority over us, and it is for the same reason that any claim to represent 
the meaning of a text constitutes a covert exercise of power” (Cohn, 2006, p. 25).  It 
is obvious here that the traditions of bureaucratic authority, from queuing procedures 
at the local social services office to defense contracting in Iraq, are not adequately 
justified for all contingencies at all times.  Rorty (2006) argues that we do not have to 
sign on to the epistemology that demands obedience to overconfident representations. 
The resultant notion of authority lay somewhere between the pragmatic need 
for a locus of justification for an action and a self-awareness of the contingency (and 
irony and solidarity) of the actual reasoning process that works from the initial 
precept of the justification.  That is to say that a neopragmatist authority needs be 
apologetic, democratic, and liberal at the same time.  To avoid lapsing into relativism 
(i.e. basing authority from a Platonic ideal or standard), authority must be equally 
accessible to all members of the community that recognize that authority.  It must be 
egalitarian in quality and, with certain skill qualifications, easily transferred from 
those who wield authority to those who respect it.   
The neopragmatist society would resemble the Athenian polis in that all 
citizens would have a rightful place in the council because authority is not an elite 
quality (excepting that only certain Athenians were qualified to be on the level of 
“equal” citizens).  Perhaps more appropriately, neopragmatic authority can be seen in 
Vonnegut’s (1998) dystopia of Harrison Bergeron where all citizens are equally – 
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 albeit artificially – qualified to hold authority because the idea that one citizen knows 
better than another is incoherent.  Rorty would appreciate this backhanded insult to 
relativism while noting that the real lesson is that authority is best understood as the 
democratic agreement that it can exist; neopragmatist authority resides in consensus 
that comes from a community. 
 
4.3 Neopragmatizing American Public Administration 
Truth viewed in the Platonic way, as the grasp of what Rawls calls “an order 
antecedent to and given to us”, is simply not relevant to democratic politics. 
(Rorty, 1991, p. 191). 
 
Snider (2000b) situates pragmatism as concurrent to, although not readily 
recognizable as a strong influence on, the development of public administration.  He 
summarized that, “pragmatism collapsed the distinction between thought and action 
and thus also the distinctions between ends and means, facts and values” (p. 137).  
Talking about what is most effective, efficient, economical, or even what may be 
most practical for public administration is a misguided effort for neopragmatism.  By 
deflating the traditions of the metanarrative and essentially erasing the past record of 
governance as the standard of assessment, neopragmatism leaves only two elements 
for public administration to hold in the discipline: experience and discourse.  As 
discussed earlier, the methods of public administration must be suspect in the face of 
contingencies.  Even the coping mechanisms, such as the consideration of precedents 
or utilizing expertise for discretionary decisions, are not free from scrutiny in the 
neopragmatist’s approach despite their proximity to the ideas of pragmatism.   
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 Looking at the beginnings of American public administration, we may ask if 
there is evidence that the Founders had any neopragmatist inclinations.  It is an 
anachronistic enquiry, but in the History of Ideas method it can be an informative 
pursuit to trace the lineage of influences by illuminating when they first appeared and 
analyzing the idea reflectively (Spicer, 2004, 2007a, 2007b).  The Founders had ideas 
that can be posthumously categorized as neopragmatist.  Arendt (2000) viewed the 
Constitution as a dispersing authority among so many competing offices as to remove 
it as a foundational element of the American liberal state.  Spicer (1995, p. 35) points 
out that there were inklings of anti-rationalism in the constitutional design, suggesting 
that the Founders were aware that their paradigm might not answer all questions of 
governance.  Much the way that the Federal system was designed to accommodate 
competition between factions and branches of government (Rohr, 1998; Spicer, 2003, 
2007a), a neopragmatist approach positions public administration as the facilitator of 
discourse and with an eye to coherency with the Constitution.  Public administration 
is positioned to “serve as a mediator of political conflict within our civil association,” 
says Spicer (2001, p. 137) as he recalls Rohr’s (1986) notion of public administration 
as the constitutional “balance wheel.”  This is a pragmatic application of public 
administrators’ discretion – a necessary but acceptable concession for the democratic 
republic to affirm solidarity for the governance process and building consensus on 
public problems.  From the other side of the debate, the Anti-Federalists pure 
liberalism and ad hoc approach to governance serves the pragmatists’ interest in 
outcome-oriented organization in that erecting a fixed government to address future 
problems would be an effort in futility, if not tyranny (or authoritarianism).   
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 The Founders were undeniably principled as the Federalist/Anti-Federalist 
debates raged over their respective tenets (Wootton, 2003), however, and their 
propensity to posit rationalist ideals and Enlightenment political philosophy for sturdy 
foundations go against the grain of neopragmatism.  They sought to establish 
traditions from the outset by grounding their Constitution in values and ideas that 
were already fixed in colonial society, essentially repurposing the metanarrative of 
governance from British goals to American objectives (Spicer, 1995).  So although 
we can look to the Founders for some inspiration in neopragmatism, we also know 
that the Constitution is the root text of the American public administration 
metanarrative.  There is no argument to be made here; this look back is merely to 
suggest that administrative authority has evolved from ideas that were developed with 
openings for continual redescription. 
Neopragmatizing the context of liberal constitutionalism is not such a stretch.  
Rorty does not critique the U.S. Constitution as a document in a political treatise, but 
his understanding of America as a citizen, as a philosopher of the national strain, and 
as a champion of bourgeois liberalism (1991, pp. 197-202) illuminates how to 
redescribe the document for the purposes of social progress.  He looked to Thomas 
Jefferson to support his argument that democracy has priority of philosophy, that 
America is its own idea without pretense to a higher Truth, and that “the question of 
whether justifiability to the community with which we identify entails truth is simply 
irrelevant” (Rorty, 1991, p. 177).  Although he notes that, “The so-called 
neopragmatists do not… see themselves as representing anything distinctively 
American” (1999, p. 25), Rorty himself had much to be admire about American 
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 liberalism.  He applauds the democratic spirit of inquiry that Dewey expressed with 
the romanticized notion of the national experiment that looks “to the substance of 
things hoped for” (1999, p. 27).  Neopragmatizing the constitution means using the 
document as an enduring American tradition – a small-t, localized truth – on which to 
base discourse about what public problems are hindering our social progress.  The 
constitution as the defining document of the American conception of social progress 
is the metaphor to Rorty’s definition of liberalism as the avoidance of cruelty and 
injustice.  The existence of dozens of constitutional amendments speak to reconciling 
its semi-permanence with the neopragmatist need for continual conversation about 
whether what we are doing to advance social progress is relevant to our current 
context and shared understandings of justice. 
The redescription of liberal constitutionalism allows the process to be brought 
forward into the relationship between public administration and the polity for the 
three traditions of administrative authority as treated in Chapter 2.  Box (2002) admits 
that pragmatism – and by extension neopragmatism, since he is discussing it in the 
context of postmodern discourse theory – “presents an especially strong argument 
against objectivity, certainty, and traditional perspectives on public policy 
formulation and implementation” (p. 26) in the effort to legitimize administrative 
authority.   
The major reshaping of public administration by the neopragmatist’s hammer 
deflates the idea that the traditional practices of public administration always have 
something useful to say about what public administration should do now.  
Discounting the authority of the discipline’s faith in rational empiricism to address 
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 public problems, Spicer (2005) argues that, “the postmodern condition limits the role 
of conventional social science in public administration because it increases the 
incidence, as well as the visibility, of conflicts between incompatible and 
incommensurable human ends or values” (p. 669).  In other words, there can neither 
be a universal normative sentience of public administration (that kind of stuff belongs 
in our values debates and the realm of politics), nor can the authority of public 
administration be determined by a transcendent metaphysical knowledge of what is 
best for the polity.   
Furthermore, a public administration that finds purpose in current public 
problems and must adjust to the contingencies of those problems’ contexts must 
reflect that purpose to some extent in its organizational structure.  Neopragmatizing 
the context of public administration means that the realm of practice for governance 
is rightly situated in policies and practices that are useful to the outcomes we would 
like to see.  The context is a matter of appropriateness – the right tool for the job – 
that extends to the structure of administrative organizations.  When the authority of 
governance is understood as problem-specific, contingent, and democratically 
formed, then the activity and form of public administration must reflect that 
perspective as well.  In fact, the organization must have less structure than the 
traditional Weberian model of bureaucracy in order to avoid hinging authority on the 
office, a structure that forces occasional incoherencies between an authority that must 
address problems that extend beyond the intended scope of that office.  In Rorty’s 
world of ad hoc associations for the problems we face today – a result of anti-
foundationalism – an over-formalized administrative body cannot embody enough 
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 democratic flexibility to satisfy his liberalism and produce nondiscriminatory 
practices.  The hierarchical organizational form with its “one best way” of 
management (Taylor, 1998) is not nearly flexible enough to allow the adaptations 
necessary to implement governance that is responsive to the dynamic context and 
public problems that drive public administration.  Alford and Hughes (2008) point out 
the shortcomings of the traditional model of bureaucracy and the New Public 
Management: 
[They] constituted “one size fits all” views of the world.  Each embodied a 
characteristic set of arrangements that were seen as applicable to all 
governmental organizations.  Now, scholars are beginning to characterize the 
post-NPM world as one based on assumptions that one or another model is the 
answer to most of the deficiencies of the public sector. However, these too 
suffer from their own assumptions that there is one best way. (p. 131). 
 
  Although it may be inconceivable for public administration to abandon its 
traditional bureaucracy when so many arguments for its efficiency and effectiveness 
have been predicated on the old structures, the forms of authority that are reshaped by 
neopragmatism require a supporting organizational scheme.  In keeping with the 
theme of neopragmatism, that scheme must be shaped by the problem it addresses, 
peopled by the community of inquiry surrounding the problem, and ultimately used to 
advance social progress through democratic discourse.  Suffice it to say, we have not 
seen too many examples of this idea in modern American public administration. 
4.3.1 Neopragmatizing Representation 
[L]aw, for example, derives its force from what lies “beneath” or “above” it 
– that is, from a higher truth, principle, or some underlying foundational 
process or logic.  I call this disembodied form of authority representation 
because the artifacts of authority and those that speak in its name are 
distanced from the origin of their authority.  They do not embody.  (Catlaw, 
2007a, p. 105). 
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 The traditional notion of public administration as representation, involving 
administrators as the faithful implementers of the democratic will, does not withstand 
the neopragmatist’s hammer blows.  Representation in the new approach makes 
governance the act of mediation over language between epistemic communities.  As 
Rorty (1979) shattered the potential of mirroring reality, especially given the issues of 
competing redescriptions, the possibility of public administration having legitimate 
authority to represent anything beyond its own interests is similarly rejected.  A 
public administration that purports to represent anything is actually dealing in 
redescriptions of experience and layers of abstraction, from the neopragmatists 
perspective.   
Catlaw (2007a) argues that public administration actually constructs its 
authority as representation through exclusionary discursive practices.  He asks, “What 
formal institutional arrangements grow around the dominant mode of deciding?” 
holding that such questions “basically turn on the question of authority” because, 
“What authority does, on one level, is to ground and legitimate a decision on the 
exclusion” (p. 100).  Viewing authority as the arbiter of exclusion speaks to the 
neopragmatist’s objection to legitimating knowledge at the expense of others (i.e. as a 
form of cruelty) and coercing consensus for representation by claiming Truth in the 
redescriptions used for decision making.  Catlaw portrays administrative authority as 
a drawing of boundaries; those excluded by what public administration is 
representing are removed from the discourse that determines public problems, a 
discourse that is, “constitutive of what is visible, thinkable, and possible” (p. 100).  
Thus, he comes to the position that, “decision making is first and foremost a decision 
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 on this exclusion, a decision on what shall be left out.  This is fundamentally a 
discursive (authoritative) practice” (p. 104). 
Harmon (2006) makes the argument that representation invokes the 
dichotomy of knowing/doing and bifurcates governance, “leaving the false 
impression that objective, and therefore authoritative, knowledge precedes and may 
even determine the content of action” (p. 130).  This in turn raises issues of 
justification for administrative action, necessitating that action corresponds to an ideal 
and removing opportunity for discretion to tailor policy for contingencies and context.  
Harmon continues: 
Political representation further presupposes that the objects to be represented – 
either the will of the People or their particular interests – already exist in 
preconstituted form.    If this were true, it might indeed be sensible to think of 
politics and administration as mutually compatible means for, first, identifying 
what those objects “really” are and then achieving them efficiently and 
effectively.  Such a suggestion, however, immediately encounters the 
objection that the category of the People itself, abetted by authoritative 
judgments based on the presupposition of homogeneity, shapes the 
constitution of interests in particular ways and prohibits their constitution in 
other ways.  The presumed givenness of those interests would obviate the 
need for, and would in fact prevent, acts of collaboration through which 
citizens constitute and continually reconstitute them. (p. 131). 
 
Wamsley’s view (in Wamsley et al., 1990) of the role of administrators as 
agents, although it shares many traits of the model criticized by Harmon and Catlaw, 
provides support for crafting the neopragmatist idea of public administration as 
representation.  He speaks of the need for a “consensual process” that “relies on a 
creative synergism that results in an agreed-upon solution transcending the sum of the 
parts, that is, the self-interests brought by the participants” (p. 119).  The public 
administrator as agent, “may provide the key impetus and painfully lacking 
communitarian moral authority for our government of fractionated power and our 
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 culture of individualism” (p. 120).  We can then imagine representation for the public 
administrator as a catalyst of the “public interest dialogue” that seeks consensus away 
from the political machinations of representative politics and as the means to pursue 
the outcomes through consensus separate from the democratic deliberations of 
conflicting self-interests that are debated in terms of inputs and outputs to be 
eventually played out in the polls. 
Catlaw’s critique of authority as representation for public administration gives 
an entrance for neopragmatism, however: “The breakdown of representational 
authority and the failure to produce a positive determination of the origin and the 
capacity for collective action under the terms of the order of things (e.g., the People) 
means that decisions will no longer simply be made for us on our behalf” (2007a, p. 
112).  He looks to the individual as the decentralized sovereign, which the 
neopragmatist would enlist as the ironic liberal who, sharing the aversion to cruelty 
held by all other individuals, would join in the broadest community to allow 
representation only to the extent of that philanthropic agenda.  In other words, 
administrative authority as representation is legitimated by the administrator signing 
on to the Rortian hope of a world free from injustice as expressed in discourse with 
the community of individual liberal ironists.  Indeed, Catlaw (2006) recognizes the 
irony that is needed to reconcile authority as representation and public administration.  
“We might simply accept the rhetorical contradiction between the universality of the 
rhetoric of representation and the empirical fact of exclusion,” yet “we are asked to 
carry on as if politics really does (or could) represent the whole People’s will, 
knowing that it does not and cannot” and thus “we must adopt consciously a position 
 100
 that we know full well to be false” (p. 265).  Catlaw then offers a view of 
“representation as an aesthetic, generative process rather than a mirroring, mimetic 
one” (p. 265) that means “representation now becomes necessary, because the People 
does not exist but must be articulated” (p. 266).  The articulation that public 
administration forges into authority is found in the democratic discourse with liberal 
ironists. 
 
4.3.2 Neopragmatizing Expertise 
For the people, it is assumed, will gladly agree to become automata when we 
show them all the things – nice, solid, objective things – they can have by 
abandoning their own experience in favor of a superior race of men called 
experts.  (Follett, 1924, p. 3). 
 
The problem of equating authority with expertise for the neopragmatist is the 
epistemological elitism that such a position entails, leading to a noticeable separation 
between the polity and public administration.  The exclusive access to the knowledge 
of its practice positions public administration in conflict with the transparency 
expected in a democracy.  The image of bureaucrats operating behind the wizard’s 
curtain is unsatisfying to the public, especially when the practice fails to produce the 
expected outcomes.  The division between the public and government fosters 
exclusionary practices that diminish interaction with the community.  Furthermore, 
issues of trust arise if authority is derived from expertise that is inaccessible to the 
polity, which then can ripple into a semblance of authoritarianism as Eagan (2007) 
depicts through her analyses of authority under the auspices of Orwell, Adorno, and 
Foucault. 
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 Rorty (1998a, p. 192) admits that there are experts with valuable skill, but 
“good ideas might come from anywhere, that they are not the prerogative of an elite 
and not associated with any particular locus of authority.”  He credits that, “the rise of 
technology helped break down the traditional distinction between the ‘high’ wisdom 
of priests and theorists and the ‘low’ cleverness of artisans – thus contributing to the 
plausibility of a democratic system of government” (p. 192).  Rorty characterizes 
authoritative expertise, in the traditional sense, as having “a greater degree [of some 
form] of rationality” (p.193).  Such a view, if disconnected from social progress, can 
foster a division that leads to asymmetrical policy, injustice, and cruelty.  Expertise 
functions with an agenda and agendas are the result of goals set by belief in Truths 
and ideals.   
Snider (2000a) notes that pursuing administrative expertise qua expertise has 
issues as well: “The field’s focus on the pursuit of administrative expertise – that is, 
on knowing what to do – apparently precluded significant attention to pragmatism’s 
more open and contextual approach to administrative action as experimenting” (p. 
330, italics in original).  In her call for more democratic knowledge in public 
administration, Stivers (2008b) criticizes governance’s special episteme: 
From its earliest days, public administration defined knowledge as the result 
of systematic study pursued by experts (scientists) and applied by experts 
(trained administrators).  Not only was knowledge not democratic, its logic 
and processes were a necessary counterweight to democracy’s inherent 
instability. (p. 5). 
 
“Unfortunately, many philosophers… are still trying to hold on to the Platonic 
insistence that the principal duty of human beings is to know” (Rorty, 1998a, p. 184).  
This position is similar to that held by the citizenry in respect to public 
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 administrators’ authority and deference to their expertise.  The most disconcerting 
disruption of governance is a helpless shrug from the agency responsible.  A citizen’s 
disappointment with governance is especially concentrated when the agency did not 
know the situation, such as the Security and Exchange Commission’s failure to 
understand how bad collateralized mortgage options would cascade through the 
economy or the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s miscalculation of 
Hurricane Katrina’s destruction. 
Neopragmatizing expertise is especially tricky, however, as expertise is 
closely linked, epistemologically, to notions of objective truth.  Being an expert on a 
subject means knowing as much as there is to know, having access to the truth, and 
being able to objectively access that knowledge.  Thus an expert in a mechanical 
subject will be able to manipulate the material objects to produce the desired outcome 
more efficiently and effectively than the lay person (the normative nature of the 
desire withstanding); “on some occasions, at least, it is more rational to defer to the 
authority of the relevant expert than it is to think for oneself” (Pierson, 1994, p. 399).  
This seems both cynical (in contemporary contexts) but also pragmatic insofar as it 
recognizes efficient utility. 
For public administration, expertise is not as simple and requires a different 
analogy for most circumstances.  More apropos of public administration’s context 
would be a comparison to an expert litigator.  The attorney argues a position 
regardless for the innocence of the client in some cases and that is precisely the 
expertise that is necessary to achieve the desired outcome (i.e. the guilty thief still 
wants to be thought innocent and set free).  So it is with neopragmatizing the 
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 expertise of public administrators; we want to secularize their role, leaving the 
political process to determine the desired outcome and having the issue addressed in 
the most expedient manner. 
Yet there is a problem is assigning this kind of agency to public 
administration in that we expect public administrators to represent the political will 
through policy implementation.  There are myriad pitfalls in this arrangement; the 
postmodern take on representation essentially denies that it is a feasible, much less 
noble, endeavor.  Representation is fraught with instances of authority and thus 
authority is suspect, as well.  As discussed previously, the conflict of representation 
and authority is epistemological.  The agent who knows something and proceeds to 
act as a representative based on that knowledge in a democracy is affirming that they 
are representing the public’s interests and the authority they exercise based on the 
knowledge is no more than a transitive step between what we want and receiving the 
desired outcome.  The perversion in the process is holding the authority as a warrant 
above the public based on the agent’s representational role.  Public administrators do 
not have elite access to the knowledge from which they act but rather use once, twice, 
or thrice-removed abstractions from the “raw” consensus of the polity and are, in fact, 
necessarily misrepresenting as they tout the knowledge at the base of their action (just 
as the last in line in a game of “telephone” receives and transmits a distortion of the 
original message).   
The postmodernists have long argued this problem of representation and use it 
to form the basis of critique against authority; the aggregation of abstractions between 
an experience and the administrative reaction produce bureaucratic incoherency.  
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 Public administration is squarely in the sights of this argument as a functionary of 
representative democracy.  Cohn (2006) summarizes it neatly: “…if you no longer 
accept ‘the notion of knowledge as accurate representation,’ then you will oppose 
practices that appeal to the authority of such knowledge as erroneous or malicious” 
(pp. 11-12).   
 Rorty (1998a) discusses technical expertise as an evolved type of rationality, 
calling it an ability “that language-using human beings have” that enable them to, 
“cope with the environment by adjusting one’s reactions to environmental stimuli in 
complex and difficult ways.  This is sometimes called ‘technical reason’…” (p. 186).  
In the same essay he also attributes a form of rationality as having enlightened 
tolerance, “the ability not to be overly disconcerted by differences from oneself” and, 
It goes along with a reliance on persuasion rather than force, an inclination to 
talk things over rather than to fight, burn, or banish.  It is a virtue that enables 
individuals and communities to coexist peacefully with other individuals and 
communities, living and letting live, and to put together new, syncretic, 
compromise ways of life.  So rationality in this sense is sometimes thought of, 
as by Hegel, as quasi-synonymous with freedom. (p. 187). 
 
This description of rationality aligns neatly with the metanarratives that have 
formed administrative authority.  Rorty would prefer to see rationality as a means to 
have conversation, “To appeal to interests rather than beliefs is to urge a modus 
vivendi” that would “suggest that what makes you loyal to a smaller group may give 
you reason to cooperate in constructing a larger group” because you have shared 
epistemic ground rules that allow for unforced agreement and, “with luck, achieves 
the formulation and utilization of an overlapping consensus” (2007, p. 52).  He 
continues, “any unforced agreement between individuals and groups about what to do 
creates a form of community, and will, with luck, be the initial stage in expanding the 
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 circles of those whom each party to the agreement had previously taken to be ‘people 
like ourselves’” (p. 53).  In the grander picture of neopragmatism’s idea of social 
progress, rationality can serve as the communal rules of engagement “to permit 
agreement on how to coexist without violence” (p. 54).  The connection of rationality 
and authority is then predicated on public administrators being technocrats of 
rationality; experts in the language of rationality for the purposes of reaching 
agreement. 
Where Rorty is critical of rationality for being susceptible to abuse as an 
exclusionary practice (a deviation of rationality that deems one to be “more rational” 
than another for not exhibiting the higher forms of technical reason or tolerance), so 
too would his view critique authority as being vulnerable to asymmetrical abuse.  
Wielding rationality as expertise is recognized as exerting authority in administrative 
practice, the authority to govern is grounded in the administrator’s knowledge of what 
can be done.  “Superiority is, for a pragmatist, always relative to the purpose 
something is being asked to serve,” Rorty writes (1998a, p. 195).  Public 
administrators’ expertise is the exercise of authority in assessing superior means to 
the desired outcomes.  Pierson supports this by noting that, “A layperson defers to the 
authority of experts, not because in so doing one is guaranteed the truth-of-the-matter, 
but because one lacks the means to determine the issue oneself.  In deferring to 
experts, one is not deferring simply to particular knowledge claims, but to a process 
for making those claims” (1994, p. 402).  Although the neopragmatist would like us 
all to have commensurable vocabularies in the episteme of governance, practical 
limitations – e.g. the limitations of sensitive national defense information or ability to 
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 process air quality data – mean that there will be experts who do hold “higher” access 
and have a form of authority based on such; “the expert has epistemic authority over 
the layperson when the former is better situated to sort the true from the false” 
(Pierson, 1994, p. 404). 
The characteristic of tolerance that Rorty also prescribes to rationality may be 
considered an advanced form of authority – the openness to other ideas as objectives.  
This twist of authority away from dictatorial notions and toward a facilitator role is a 
higher level of rationality that seeks to apply technical expertise to its fullest extent 
for any consensual, “syncretic, compromise ways of life” that do not have limited 
options.  Rorty makes the technical expert into an enabler of possibility who offers 
service to the community by conversation, looking for utility aligned with the context.  
In this sense, the neopragmatist administrator, as technical expert, is not carrying a 
hammer and treating every problem as a nail but rather is offering the hammer (their 
expertise) as an option to work with other tools as possible.   
 
4.3.3 Neopragmatizing Practice 
The restoration of an understanding of governance as the exercise of practical 
wisdom, then, involves moving away from the idea that most administrative 
decision making can be made definitive and comprehensive, toward greater 
reliance on tentative strategies that self-correct…Practical wisdom implies, as 
well, the exercise of judgment within the context of a process that renders it 
accountable to citizens…  (Stivers, in Wamsley et al., 1990, p. 260). 
 
For pragmatism, there is no such thing as an idea that is good in theory but 
doesn’t work in practice.  (Stivers, 2008a, p. 126). 
 
The problem with viewing administrative authority as practice is that it 
promotes an undemocratic sense of elitism for governance; only those who have the 
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 requisite practical experience are qualified to govern.  This approach can be 
understood as defining an exclusive community of inquiry for administrators to wield 
authority because they alone have the bank of experience and opportunity to practice 
governance.  The Athenian model avoided this problem by rotating all citizens into 
public office, yet this idea is obviously impractical today.  The result is a self-
supporting method of categorizing practice within the discipline that is applied to 
contexts and contingencies beyond the halls of bureaucracy.  Unfortunately, the 
concessions required for rooting authority in practice lead to postmodern problems of 
administrators utilizing a final vocabulary, which is the keystone of the failing 
metanarrative.  Proposing that public administration’s authority rests in a specialized 
episteme – a knowledge of governance that is only accessed by being in the business 
of governance – runs contrary to the deepest democratic convictions of equity. 
Rorty proposed that, “It does not matter whether we can get consensus on 
moral principles as long as we can get it on practices” (2007b, p. 921).  This is not 
equated to the notion of a convention, however, as this would be considered 
“something more fixed and stable than the settled (for the moment) habits and 
practices of particular human communities” (Bacon, 2006, p. 868).  Consensus as a 
practice is a:  
Summary of current agreement, not a foundation to be appealed to in order to 
secure an agreement.  Any consensus is itself a reflection of the state of 
conversation, not something that participants in that conversation can appeal 
to against their conversational partners. (p. 868). 
 
It is likely that Rorty would have targeted institutional memory as the first 
referent for administrative practice.  As the record of past practice that has been 
habituated into a form of tradition in the metanarrative of public administration, 
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 institutional memory has served as the “go to” justification for much activity.  The 
tradition of public administration as practice relies too much on outputs as a 
justification (seen as performance measurement) in contrast to the creativity of an 
outcome-focused approach.  The output-centric type of governance is an empirical 
authority that repeatedly sees its past practices as fixed methods that can be tweaked 
to achieve the desired performance measures.   
Recursive practices in public administration must be reframed; policy 
implementation processes that jam regulations into current contexts despite 
contingencies must be supplanted with a more contemplative application of policy.  
Recursive practices are strains of tradition that happen “within determinable limits” 
that “are formed by the expectations of others and cocreated by competent selves 
grasping, accepting, and performing within the limits of those expectations,” 
according to Miller and Fox (2007, p. 84).  They argue that the limits “become 
structures of varying strength and duration” which a neopragmatist can accept as long 
as the structures are not overly habitualized.  Someplace between the expectation of 
predictability and the need to update approaches, public administration must frame 
recursive practices as a form of guidance when contingencies do not overstep the 
“determinable limits” and as less than the rule of thumb when the context of a public 
problem is unique.  
Bogason (2001) summarizes the postmodern push in public administration by 
calling for more situational analysis, seeing pragmatism’s pairing of problem with 
practice as the reasonable approach.  “Habitual convention is what institutions are 
made of,” according to Miller and Fox (2001, p. 679), and “recursive practices are 
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 carried out habitually, passively, and ordinarily without reflection or discourse.”  
Stivers (2008b) provides another take on practice: “Experience is contingent on the 
circumstances of particular situations and no situation comes around twice.  
Therefore, learning from experience is not a matter of replicating findings from one 
situation to the next” (pp. 8-10, italics in original).   
Neopragmatism values the lessons learned from practice, but contends that 
these lessons are continually aggregated to contribute to the next set of contingencies 
that face us and cannot be empirically cataloged for applications that meet certain 
qualifications at the expense of the particularities that predicate every unique decision 
point for administrators.  In other words, Rorty would not agree that administrators’ 
discretion be limited to deciding how similar a current situation is to a past event in 
order to select the institutionalized practice that informs their decision.  This is an 
insufficient justification in democracy; it conflicts with the need for appropriateness 
by avoiding the conversation that leads to consensus.  It also implies that there are 
Truths insofar as some past problem was dealt with in an ideal way that should be 
repeated.  Institutional memory has been justified as a concession to efficiency for 
public administration, but for neopragmatism it is a lazy behavior that can doom us to 
repeating the mistakes of the past while erecting barriers between the polity and the 
government.  This is not to say that the record of practice should be discarded or that 
precedents be ignored, but that their use should be more subtly imputed as elements 
that can inform the current conversation as we strive for social progress.   
In the logic of neopragmatism, using old tools on new materials can only 
produce poor simulacra of the same outcomes that we wish to improve.  The update 
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 of material (as the metaphor for contingency) requires new approaches that may 
resemble the older techniques but are nonetheless more purposively shaped by the 
free dialogue between those who wield the tools (administrators) and those who will 
enjoy the outcomes (the polity). 
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CHAPTER V 
THE NEOPRAGMATIST ADMINISTRATOR 
The best, and probably the only, argument for putting foundationalism behind 
us is…[that] it would be more efficient to do so, because it would let us 
concentrate our energies on manipulating sentiments, on sentimental 
education.  That sort of education gets people of different kinds sufficiently 
well acquainted with one another that they are less tempted to think of those 
different from themselves as only quasi-human.  (Rorty, 1998, p. 176). 
 
This chapter will take the ideas of neopragmatist authority from the last 
chapter a bit further by postulating what tools administrators can use from the 
neopragmatist’s forgery to overcome issues of authority in governance for 
contemporary American society.  In keeping with the notion that the methods of 
inquiry are part and parcel of the actual philosophy, the outcome of this effort offers 
neither principles in a final vocabulary nor foundations for a new metanarrative of 
authority that will lead to governance as a different set of traditions.  Such a result 
would negate the main thrust of this thesis.   
As unsettling as an “anti-theory” may be – meaning a scheme that does not 
follow rational-empiricism or even dialectic models – the most solid premises of 
neopragmatism remain a liberal aversion to cruelty and the alleviation of injustice.  
Rorty worked from his (then) contemporary vantage in the essay “Looking 
Backwards from the Year 2096” (1996, pp. 243-251) to predict an optimistic re-
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 enlightenment for society that had indeed held those ideals a century in the future.  
Imputing those premises into the idea of the epistemic community – the portrayal of a 
society that is defined by shared language, interests, redescriptions, and practices of 
democratic consensus – gives the potential for approaching governance in a way that 
brings the polity and the public administration closer together.  This objective is the 
closest that the neopragmatist argument gets to voicing a universal goal, yet it is an 
admirable goal for society. 
The neopragmatist approach to public administration envisions its role as a 
facilitator of social progress, or “midwife” (Catlaw, 2006, p. 274).  Stivers (2008a) 
holds that the, “administrator accepts the inevitability of ambiguity and celebrates 
small wins” and that, “Administrative action is creative, not predictive” (p. 138).  
Hoch (2006) sees neopragmatism’s contribution to public administrators as a better 
perspective on how to approach policy implementation: “Rorty basically helps us to 
grasp the hubris of claiming epistemic trump and to beware the quest for certainty in 
the service of the powerful” (p. 389).  This humbling of the administrator’s place is 
followed by balancing the polity’s part that dictates “public expectations be shaped by 
practical alternatives sensitive to compromise and consensus” (Hoch, 2006, p. 389).   
Harmon (2006, p. 144) offers the idea of neopragmatist governance as a 
unitary conception, featuring the concepts of collaborative experimentation, practical 
theorizing, embracing uncertainty, facilitating the process of social interaction, 
legitimacy of individual differences, rationality as the intelligent vetoing, and distrust 
of any and all conceptual dualisms.  Looking to then meld Rorty’s liberalism into the 
terms between administrators and the public, Hoch (2006, p. 396) concludes that new 
 113
 pragmatism, “reminds us what we might lose if we sacrifice freedom for a more 
encompassing rational order that promises to deliver us from uncertainty and 
ambiguity” and that, “We should focus less on the questions about the creation of 
ideals and more on fostering administrative schemes or urban plans that reduce 
human suffering while offering new domains for private self-perfection.”  From 
Rorty, that implies governance in the liberal constitutional state is focused on making 
policy that alleviates injustice and cruelty through nondiscriminatory practices. 
A broad minded public administrator should consider public criticism of the 
agency to be a better outcome than bewilderment about what the agency does.  The 
former indicates the opportunity for discourse whereas the latter suggests that the 
agency is performing governance without the consent, knowledge, or authority from 
the public, even if the activity is productive by some measures.  In other words, the 
hidden or underpublicized agencies are not working toward progress because their 
undisclosed (or under-promoted) mission is obviously not in the public purview.  
Lacking the conversation with the public, the agency can be nothing more than an 
adherent to traditional practices established from outdated contexts and, therefore, is 
providing stagnant, if not regressive, public service.  Governance must be continually 
evaluated in terms of its contribution toward the outcomes that are needed for social 
progress and not being provided from other sources.  Under that rubric, the needs 
themselves must also be evaluated for currency, although that is usually in the 
purview of the political process. 
The civic-minded, postmodern bourgeois liberal can accept administrative 
authority with justifications of expertise and political warrant (representation) in 
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 democratic society.  This is predicated on there being an epistemic community that 
has agreed that social justice and progress – interpreted here as reaching consensus 
under pragmatic teleology – are understood in the conversation (implying linguistic 
equity) between public administration and the polity.  That type of epistemic 
community is derived from a shared sense of contingency, irony, and solidarity in our 
social practices. 
 
5.1 The Epistemic Community as Context 
A democratic understanding of knowledge makes it possible for the citizen 
role to broaden beyond voting to participation in constructing and 
interpreting the information and understandings that guide public decision-
making. In this way, it tempers representation, which otherwise cuts most 
citizens off from any direct share in governing. Participation in the 
development of knowledge empowers citizens even though they may never 
serve as legislators, judges, or administrators.  (Stivers, 2008b, p. 2). 
 
At task is the reconciliation of the use of authority in the democratic state 
while avoiding incoherencies between the will of the people and its fulfillment 
through governance.  This reconciliation can be approached through an understanding 
of community.  For classical pragmatists such as Dewey and his adherents, it is a 
“community of inquiry,” while those who identify more closely with neopragmatism 
may refer to the “epistemic community.”  There is one significant material difference 
between the two appellations as the latter term reaches further into the linguistic 
aspects of a community, i.e. the language of the community is integral to its recog-
nized purposes.  This aspect is played out in the debate over the nature of experience; 
the neopragmatist’s do not share classical pragmatists’ value of experience before 
being put into language.  Indeed, the neopragmatists are not sure that experience can 
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 be part of our epistemology without language (i.e. The Linguistic Turn).  Language’s 
purpose – communication in a community – then implicates experience as a social 
construct with temporal qualities (Koopman, 2007 p. 710-713), necessitating the 
advance from the community of inquiry to the idea of the epistemic community, 
hereby appropriated as the neopragmatist context of administrative authority and 
developed in the following.  
Shields (2003) refers to the community of inquiry as an organizing principle 
for addressing a problematic situation that “encourages better method, better theory, 
and democracy” (p. 512).  Her position is supported by Hildebrand (2008), who 
explains that, “If the background of democratic life is rooted in community, its 
complementary foreground is inquiry, the epistemic actions with which communities 
solve problems and improve conditions”, to which he adds, “Inquiry assumes a social 
character when we appreciate that most major problems engage groups, not just 
individuals” (p. 224).   
From Miller and Fox (2001, p. 682) we get confirmation that, “Norms of 
inquiry are socially mediated within epistemic communities,” which they define as “a 
group of inquirers who have knowledge problems to solve.  An epistemic community 
produces small-t local truth and not big-T universal Truth” (p. 669).  Translating 
epistemic community as “knowledge-society”, Sundstrom (2000) describes it pur-
posively as “a network of professionals with expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain 
or issue area” (p. 1).  This understanding of the epistemic community provides a basis 
for its role in the neopragmatist approach as the center of conversation; the epistemic 
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 community is the discursive site where the polity and public administration work out 
problems and decide on the authority to implement solutions for social progress.   
 The epistemic community is similar to the community of inquiry except that 
its functional boundaries are determined by the agreement of participants as to the 
language that they use (i.e. science, metaphysics, astrology, etc.).  The boundaries of 
a community expand or contract to comprise the polity that has similar interests and 
ideas about how to go about making social progress.  Thus, an epistemic community 
may be a gated community whose interests are privacy and security, a religious group 
whose interests are moral behavior, a county that has interests in economic 
development, or an entire nation’s perspective on taxes.  The possible epistemic 
communities may be considered alternative movements, competing paradigms, or 
even factions in pluralistic societies.  It is Rorty’s hope that these communities can be 
as large as possible as humans come together in the “contingency, irony, and 
solidarity” scheme to achieve a level of global agreement (1989).  This hinges on the 
classical pragmatist tenet that knowledge is justified true belief being aggrandized by 
Rorty’s (1979) position that the pursuit of knowledge and the pursuit of agreement 
are one and the same: “The application of such honorifics as ‘objective’ and 
‘cognitive’ is never anything more than an expression of the presence of, or the hope 
for, agreement among inquirers” (p. 335).  This is most clear as Rorty tries to expand 
the idea of justice to a near-universal consensus – as the broadest exemplar of 
localized truth:  
If we Westerners could get rid of the notion of universal moral obligations 
created by membership in the species, and substitute the idea of building a 
community of trust between ourselves and others, we might be in a better 
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 position to persuade non-Westerners of the advantages of joining in that 
community.  (2007, p. 55). 
 
Each epistemic community is regarded as equitable among its members in the 
Rawlsian sense, meaning that there is no outright discrimination or asymmetrical 
preferences in the community.  Because they have shared interests, the members 
pursue those interests from a common starting point.  By extension, all epistemic 
communities are equally valid as they pursue inquiry into making the world less cruel 
and more just.  This notion feeds the neopragmatist nature; a world without Truths 
means that we all have a fair claim to ideas.  When an idea is accepted by a group that 
then builds consensus to make it an objective of progress, an epistemic community 
emerges.  Consider a set of equations to explain how neopragmatism and the 
epistemic community are related: 
f (Neopragmatism) = Epistemic Community + Social Progress 
Epistemic Community = Community of Inquiry + (Postmodernism + The 
Linguistic Turn) 
This scheme posits that neopragmatism’s function (f) is the outcome of an 
epistemic community and social progress.  As Chapter 3 discussed, social 
progress is defined as moving away from cruelty and injustice through the 
liberalism circumscribed by contingency, irony, and solidarity.  The idea of the 
epistemic community is then broken down into the pragmatist idea of the 
community of inquiry and the addition of the postmodern skepticism of 
metanarratives plus the linguistic turn that repositions our experiences into 
matters of language (Koopman, 2007).   
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 The common denominator of any epistemic community is the shared language 
and that its members are coherently governed if their public administration shares the 
language.  This is realized already in the United States to a certain degree as English 
is the official language, but the contention here is that there just is not enough of a 
connection between public administration and the possibility of all the various 
communities (e.g. certain southwestern states have repeatedly had movements for bi-
lingual policies).  The authority of public administration has to be commensurable to 
the epistemic community at some common level or it will result in incoherent policy 
implementation.  Is there a Spanish term for collateralized mortgage obligation?  
 This last point may be examined in greater detail in terms of justice.  
Recalling that justice (and avoiding cruelty) are Rorty’s only principles for liberal 
society, it follows that the most restrictive epistemic community – i.e. a group whose 
interests and language result in specific curtails to personal freedom – is at the lower 
end of the spectrum of liberalism.  This group’s interests are so specific that to 
overlay its boundaries to another community that did not share its interests, the 
competing paradigms and incommensurability would surely lead to injustice and 
cruelty between members of the “original” epistemic community and those who were 
encompassed in its expansion.  Conversely, the least restrictive epistemic community 
that enjoys the greatest personal freedom under with shared interests and language 
would be the entire Earth’s population.  We may only imagine that the shared 
interests and language are the most elementary: food, shelter, and simple gestures 
determine the global epistemic community.  This scheme reflects the American 
federal system – correlating the various levels of epistemic community to the 
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 Founder’s concerns with factions and political parties – and ties the epistemic 
community to the context in which it operates much as the northeastern states had a 
different set of contingencies as the southern states. 
 Epistemic authority, therefore, comes from the use of knowledge that is 
justified by the community.  Just as Rorty allows localized truths (as determined 
by communities of inquiry) to serve in the pursuit of social progress, so too do we 
allow localized authority (as determined by epistemic communities) to serve in 
the interest of administration’s pursuit of solving public problems based on those 
localized truths.  It is a relative of relativism, although it has purpose beyond 
explaining a perspective, in that the determinant of knowledge is in the interests 
of the community’s pursuit of progress and meaningful outcomes.  “Thus it seem 
that Rorty analyzes both truth and justice in terms of a practice of justification that 
takes place within a particular community of inquiry, and in accordance with local 
norms” (Thompson, 2001, p. 36).  This take on Rorty means that the practice of 
justification is the whole of administrative authority; public administration has 
authority by its ability to justify governance as the treatment of public problems.  
The epistemic community is the discourse framework for public administration 
and the polity to come to agreement in a common language for (re-)descriptions 
of those problems. 
 
5.2 Forging Administrative Authority 
Public administration exists to solve public problems…The most stable and 
deeply rooted public trust is produced by methods that are objective and 
democratic…Objectivity is not the assurance that an inquiry or judgment has 
been completed from a completely ahistorical or apersonal point of view; 
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 rather, it is the assurance that the inquiry or judgment has been done in a way 
that allows open access, testability, and public verifiability of the process.  
(Hildebrand, 2008, p. 226). 
 
Authority is a necessary and enduring element of the relationship between 
public administration and the polity as they come together to solve problems.  The 
acceptance of governance, as evidenced by the existence of a fairly stable American 
society, includes an implicit acceptance of the requisite authority that administration 
needs to implement policy.  The greater the problem, the greater authority as 
determined by the consensus over how cruel or unjust it is.  Miller (2004) credits 
“both old and new pragmatists” as understanding that governing in a democracy 
“does not rest upon the idea that life must be subjected to some universal standard or 
preemptory authority that takes priority over every lived moment” (p. 248).  From 
this, we can begin to understand that neopragmatism can come to terms with authority 
by blurring the locus of authority – it is forged by the polity and public administration 
hammering away at problems in discourse.  It is the task of public administration to 
enable the conversation by fostering inquiry by the epistemic community. 
Stivers (2008a, p. 130) recalls Ralph Waldo Emerson’s idea of “onwardness” 
as a relation of progress in the neopragmatist’s vein.  She notes that inquiry is 
propelled by “the task of onwardness” that “entails the willingness to live with 
ambiguity”, a condition that runs counter to administrators’ inherent hope for 
definitive solutions to problems.  Although “onwardness” as a poetic term captures 
the contingency and dynamism of governance, it also hearkens back to the idea of 
authority as problem-driven.  He who rallies the troops to carry forth in the pursuit of 
progress – whatever that may end up being – is the leader that recognizes that current 
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 conditions may be better further along.  This leader is the authority only to the extent 
of encouraging a pace just as the authority of public administration is now seen as 
encouraging conversation to continue. 
Referring to Hildebrand’s (2008, p. 226) statement of purposive governance 
above – “public administration exists to solve public problems” – the public problem 
is situated as the source and ultimate authority.  This is in contrast to Raadschelders 
and Stillman’s (2007, p. 26) perspective that situates the people as the final repository 
of authority; they posit that, “whatever is regarded as authoritative…is subject to 
negotiation” and the result is decided by majority rule.  Putting the problem as the 
authoritative entity is a much more pragmatist contention, as it removes the variety of 
individuals’ redescriptions of their experiences from getting in the way of the pursuit 
of outcomes.  That is to say that if authority is found in the people, then the people 
make the justification as to what is a problem.  What is a problem for some may not 
be a problem for others.  The arbitrariness of such delineations leaves public 
administration open for opportunities to practice discriminatory, cruel and unjust 
governance.  Seeing the problem as the impetus for assignations of authority is more 
appropriate for public administration in two ways.  First, it is more likely to bring 
those with expertise and interest to bear on the problem.  Second, the use of authority 
will be contained for the set of contingencies that accompanied the problem rather 
than calling on a more general authority from a preexisting context that will bluntly 
address the problem. 
The logical progression from there is quite simple: if the problem is the source 
of authority, then the conversation between the polity and public administration 
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 determines the use of that authority.  This makes neopragmatic sense because it 
appeals to the context of the administration/polity conversation as the impetus for 
assigning authority on a case-by-case basis.   Neopragmatism’s application is further 
supported as an approach when we concede that the problem at the center of the 
activity and assignation of authority is always a product of our experiences, which are 
necessarily a description (or redescription) when discussed with others, and thus the 
problem becomes a linguistic issue.  As Rorty (1979) illustrates in the confusion of 
such a perspective, “We might just be saying something – participating in a 
conversation rather than contributing to an inquiry.  Perhaps saying things is not 
always saying how things are.  Perhaps saying that is itself not a case of saying how 
things are” (p. 371).  The competing re-/descriptions of the problem are language 
issues that must be reconciled between the polity and administration and thus an 
approach that recognizes this contingency to the situation is an appropriate means. 
Although we must be careful promoting a communitarian view of society 
where it is not warranted, a neopragmatist approach to public administration from 
such a perspective is easily reconciled.  The communitarian version of authority 
works on the reassurance that the public administrator is just like you, the citizen.  
This can be seen when the bureaucrat empathizes with the citizen, they connect 
through conversation, and understand that the authority to implement the policy 
comes from the acceptance of the community that the policy is justified by the 
democratic process.  This reinforces the element of solidarity in neopragmatism, 
although not necessarily the element of consensus if either the administrator or the 
citizen does not share the values of the policy.  Yet it is a democratic conflict of 
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 values that resulted in the eventual consensus and that conflict, practiced through 
conversation between administrators and the polity, is always a sign of social 
progress for the neopragmatist. 
The major challenge for public administration is signing on to the idea that the 
discipline can survive without the metanarrative of authority.  Governance may be 
seen as set adrift if it is not tied to the anchors of rational empiricism.  Moreover, 
public administration would be in a difficult spot if it took the first steps toward 
neopragmatism – meaning that it shook off the shackles of the tradition that were 
founded in the Cartesian enlightenment, developed by the Founders into the 
Constitution, and affirmed through years of practice – and did not offer an equally 
succinct method for governance.  It is neopragmatism’s contention that doing away 
with the metanarrative does not necessitate the offering of a replacement 
metanarrative and that the abandonment of one theory does not require a successor 
theory, even if it holds a tenuous position until a third theory is brought into practice.  
Stivers (2008a) points out that administrators must come to terms with the lack of 
fixtures and finality; they realize that solutions are more often than not temporary, 
that, “the situations they find themselves in are seldom resolved, only dealt with in 
some way that enables them to move on…they will find a measurement and a method 
they can live with for the time being” (p. 125).  She sees administrators as already 
being functionally pragmatists, especially in terms using theory, experience, and 
practice together, yet governance is still tethered to foundationalism: 
Pragmatism seems to be a rather slippery, shifting basis for public sector 
practice.  Despite the central place of life experience, there is something 
frustrating about a guide to public life that so roundly resists being solidified.  
Downplaying abstractions and theories has undeniable appeal to people 
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 struggling to cope with conflicting demands and multiple accountabilities.  
Still, those same demands and accountabilities give rise to a certain longing to 
know that there is something underneath it all that can serve as a reference 
point, a ground – if not to stand firmly on, at least to move forward from.  
Pragmatism does offer a ground of sorts, though it is more of a process than a 
structure. (p. 133). 
 
A final argument is now assembled to forge administrative authority from the 
neopragmatist forgery.  Calling upon the more general, inoffensive, and digestible 
concepts discussed up to this point, this logic portrays the gist of the effort: 
1. Justice is the equitable administration of democratically determined outcomes 
(a combination of consensus and the contingency/irony/solidarity idea from 
Rorty). 
 
2. The pursuit of justice and its corollary, the effort to realize consequences 
(outcome experiences) that are less cruel and unjust than our experiences in 
present contexts, defines social progress. 
 
3. Authority is guidance in the redescription of experiences that inform our 
assessment of present contexts vis-à-vis justice. 
 
4. Administrative authority is the agent of progress. 
 
Public administrators who view their position as the warranted exercise of authority 
in the pursuit of justice will see governance as a mechanism for social progress.   
 
5.3 Implications of the Approach 
It was amusing to learn that recent translations of Nietzsche’s The Gay 
Science are being published as The Joyous Science…The meaning of a word 
obtains only in each particular usage of it.  Even then, there is no law that 
says it has to indicate anything at all (Miller & Fox, 2001, p. 674). 
 
 The contribution of this thesis is an approach for governance that raises the 
necessary doubt when an administrative practice does not fit the context because it is 
steeped in regressive traditions.  Box (2002) supports the idea of pragmatic discourse 
as legitimating public administration, seeing the discourse as having, “the potential to 
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 release new understandings of social conditions and possibilities for collective action” 
that “may give citizens opportunities to take public will formation in new and 
different directions that challenge the status quo” (p. 21).  The approach requires that 
the implementation of policy is developed through discursive means, not based upon 
the positivism of universal Truths or incrementally altered by the feedback loop that 
“generates immanent irrationalities” (Miller & Fox, 2007, p. 25).  Harmon (2006) 
offers the alternative to the prevailing metanarrative: 
If reverting to modernity’s assumptions and solutions is no longer possible, 
the realistic alternative appears to lie in inventing strategies and encouraging 
social practices for making the best of those social, political, and economic 
conditions now classified under the heading of globalization. (p. 147). 
 
The question of how to promote a form of democracy reconceived as 
collaborative interaction should be acknowledged as [public administration’s] 
central challenge.  A public administration no longer obliged to defend 
collaboration’s legitimacy as a philosophical proposition is therefore free to 
confront that challenge on practical terms. (p. 149). 
 
 Selling pragmatism to the polity as a guiding philosophy of public 
administration is straightforward; we practice what is useful in producing desired 
outcomes.  The rules that govern those practices are in the Constitution and under its 
guidance we should endeavor to remain fair participants in democracy.  Adding in the 
context of liberalism, we support an individualistic, bootstrap-yanking attitude and 
when we recognize that governance is the necessary and practical means for a public 
problem, it will be provided with efficiency and effectiveness to the extent of the 
community’s desired progress.  This compilation of American philosophy is a smooth 
blending of traditional public administration theory that then allows discretionary 
authority to account for contingencies as long as justifications are aligned with the 
outcomes.  Pragmatism would not have it otherwise, although the classical notion still 
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 clings to the metanarrative insofar as methods and precedents hold significant sway 
over policy implementation. 
 Advancing neopragmatism, in contrast to the above, requires a paradigm shift 
that is undoubtedly frightening because we would be asking the polity to accept the 
dissolution of the predictable in pursuit of the possible.  Institutional memory must no 
longer serve as the default mode for informing practice.  The effort required to gather 
consensus will undoubtedly slow the pace of governance as it is currently arranged, 
although this is not a bad thing if the value of social progress increases at the expense 
of practices that are cruel and unjust. 
There are incoherencies in the Federal system, realized as conflicts 
between state and federal courts, which carry over to the notion of multiple 
echelons of epistemic communities.  The incoherencies are traced to the 
adherence to traditions that have outlasted the contingencies that shaped them in 
their original contexts, just as interests and language change in the face of a 
dynamic existence.  Public administration’s awareness of incoherent policies 
demands a substantial reaction that will bring social progress; it is responsible for 
bringing the incoherency to light, which would entail practices that work around 
the problem between the policy and social progress.  This idea sounds a call for 
discretionary authority at a level beyond the granting or withholding of policy 
benefits.  The discretionary authority of administrators to guide governance 
toward social progress entails the reconstruction of feedback loops that do not rely 
on the rational empirical processes that harbor the incoherency among the 
contingencies of the context.  It is difficult to envision how this may work, but it 
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 is no less difficult than accepting institutionalized asymmetrical benefits that 
result from the extension of traditional methods beyond their justified boundaries.   
We are left with the acknowledgement that, despite the postmodern flexibility 
of neopragmatism, it is still a philosophy, it is a theory, it is a process, and it is hereby 
proposed as a practice for public administration.  The distinguishing characteristic of 
neopragmatism that sets it apart from a metanarrative is that it does not propose a 
method for solutions beyond identifying the object of inquiry as social progress and 
hoping that the method used toward that goal is just, democratic, and appropriate as 
we come to consensus on the context of the issue at hand. 
In the final analysis, neopragmatism has to offer something to public 
administration that is attractive to practitioners and acceptable by the polity.  Yet the 
potential contribution for practice is tied to public administrators first forging a 
different role for themselves than the metanarratives have dictated and then selling it 
to the community (more appropriately, the forging would itself be a community 
process).  Just as the reinventing government movement in the early 1990’s 
prescribed “steering, not rowing”, a neopragmatist approach to governance has a 
normative stance that is rooted in liberal democratic society; namely, public 
administrators should be steering under the influence of conversations and consensus.  
If this idea appears to invite constant debate over our direction, then that perceived 
problem is soundly put down by the neopragmatist who would then suggest that our 
direction is debate and there is nothing lost by having endless discourse.  If the idea 
sparks objections about inefficiency and bureaucratic inertia in the form of continued 
discussions at the expense of material action, then those objections are also 
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 meaningful conversation and a contribution to social progress.  And if all these 
postmodern loops appear to be wasteful exercises that do not advance any agendas, 
then those agendas themselves must be suspect because they have not garnered the 
consensus (majority) to end the discussion – the objective of any rational empirical 
enquiry – and the objectors have unwittingly acceded that solidarity is not in hand.  
This is liberal democracy; the ongoing opportunity to discuss and continue 
conversation over issues without needing to make the world look like one faction’s 
ideal. 
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